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 Although September 11, 2001, was the starting point of the so-
called war on terror,1 the United States Congress had been attempting 
to combat international terrorism long before that unforgettable day.2 
The war on terror has many facets, such as military efforts to capture, 
or even kill, known terrorist leaders, as well as foreign policy aimed at 
persuading terrorist organizations to seek peace instead of violence.3 
                                                 
∗ J.D. candidate, May 2009, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of 
Technology; B.A., Psychology, 2006, University of Wisconsin–Madison. The author 
would like to extend her appreciation to Professor Hal Morris and Sandra Stipp for 
their guidance in writing this Note. The author would also like to thank Ed, Judy, 
and Susan Rowe, as well as Michael Greenspan, for their endless encouragement and 
support throughout law school. 
1 See Transcript of President Bush’s Address, CNN.com, Sept. 21, 2001, 
http://archives.cnn.com/2001/US/09/20/gen.bush.transcript (“Our war on terror 
begins with al Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist 
group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated.”). 
2 See Jennifer A. Rosenfeld, Note, The Antiterrorism Act of 1990: Bringing 
International Terrorists to Justice the American Way, 15 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. 
REV. 726, 727–28 (1992). 
3 See NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR COMBATING TERRORISM 10–11, 23 (2006), 
available at http://www.cbsnews.com/htdocs/pdf/NSCT0906.pdf. 
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But perhaps one of the most important and effective means of stopping 
terrorism is to cut off or significantly impair vital sources of funding.4 
Throughout the 1990s, Congress passed a series of laws aimed at 
doing just that. One of the most surprising components of the counter-
terrorism legislation is 18 U.S.C. § 2333, which enables private 
citizens injured by an act of international terrorism to sue for treble 
damages in federal court.5 Because Congress intended to enable 
private parties to attack terrorist funding through these civil suits, 
Congress created yet another tool for eliminating terrorism in general.6 
 While countless definitions of terrorism exist,7 the concept is 
exceedingly difficult to define—in part because what is considered as 
terrorism8 has evolved over 2000 years.9 By some accounts, the only 
                                                 
4 See id. at 12. 
5 18 U.S.C. § 2333(a) (2006). 
6 See Rosenfeld, supra note 2, at 728. 
7 The concept of terrorism has been defined in many ways, even among various 
United States agencies. See, e.g., ALEX P. SCHMID & ALBERT J. JONGMAN, 
POLITICAL TERRORISM: A NEW GUIDE TO ACTORS, AUTHORS, CONCEPTS, DATA 
BASES, THEORIES, AND LITERATURE 5–6 (1988) (identifying 109 definitions of 
terrorism encompassing twenty-two definitional elements); Louis René Beres, The 
Meaning of Terrorism—Jurisprudential and Definitional Clarifications, 28 
VANDERBILT J. TRANSNAT’L L. 239 (1995) (discussing several definitions of 
terrorism and their associated infirmities). 
8 The term terrorism was first used around the time of the French Revolution, 
the regime de la terreur, in the late eighteenth century. MARK BURGESS, CENTER FOR 
DEFENSE INFORMATION, A BRIEF HISTORY OF TERRORISM (July 3, 2003), 
http://www.cdi.org/friendlyversion/printversion.cfm?documentID=1502; see also 
RICHARD FALK, THE GREAT TERROR WAR xviii–xiv (2003). 
9 Burgess, supra note 8. Interestingly, two of the earliest historical occurrences 
of terrorism were perpetrated by Muslims and Jews, though not against each other. 
See id. The Sicari and the Zealots were active Jewish terrorist groups during the 
Roman occupation of the first century Middle East. Id. The Sicari mainly targeted 
other Jews who they believed had renounced their religious faith, while the Zealots 
murdered Romans and Greeks to “send a message” to Roman authorities and their 
collaborators. Id. The Assassins—“an 11th century offshoot of a Shia Muslim sect 
known as the Ismailis”—stabbed in broad daylight “politicians or clerics who 
refused to adopt the purified version of Islam they were forcibly spreading.” Id. As 
with the Sicari and the Zealots, the Assassins used their violence as a means of 
sending a message—often carrying out their attacks on religious holy days in an 
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generally agreed-upon characteristic of terrorism is that it involves 
violence or the threat of violence.10 Yet, this cannot be the sole 
defining feature of terrorism, because “war, coercive diplomacy, and 
barroom brawls” also involve violence and the threat of violence.11 
Thus, as one expert has explained, terrorism may be best defined by 
looking at instances that have been, or could be, commonly accepted 
as constituting terrorism.12 As another expert puts it, “[w]e know a 
terrorist act when we see one.”13 
 While terrorism has existed for millennia in many forms 
throughout the world, including in the United States, a background on 
Islamic terrorist groups14 in the Middle East region is of particular 
relevance to this Note.15 One prominent Islamic terrorist group is 
                                                                                                                   
effort to “publicize their cause and incite others to it.” Id. In addition to these Jewish 
and Muslim groups, another early example of terrorism was the Thugees, an Indian 
religious cult that ritually strangled random travelers as an offering to the Hindu 
goddess of terror and destruction, who were active during the seventeenth through 
the mid-nineteenth centuries. Id. The Thugees may have been the last religiously 
inspired terrorist group until that phenomenon reemerged in the past two or three 
decades. Id. 
10 WALTER LAQUEUR, THE NEW TERRORISM: FANATICISM AND THE ARMS OF 
MASS DESTRUCTION 6 (1999). 
11 JEFFREY RECORD, STRATEGIC STUDIES INST., BOUNDING THE GLOBAL WAR 
ON TERRORISM 6 (2003), available at 
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/Pubs/Display.Cfm?pubID=207. 
12 Burgess, supra note 8. 
13 RECORD, supra note 11, at 9. 
14 Although radical religious-based terrorist groups operating in the Middle 
East may be classified using any number of terms, this Note will refer to them as 
Islamic terrorist groups or organizations. See Eli Berman & David D. Laitin, 
Religion, Terrorism, and Public Goods: Testing the Club Model 7–10 (Nat’l Bureau 
of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 13725, 2008), available at 
http://econ.ucsd.edu/~elib/tc.pdf. 
15 Despite this Note’s focus on Islamic terrorist groups, it should be stressed 
that terrorism is by no means a phenomenon confined to those of the Islamic faith or 
even the Middle East region. To the contrary, terrorist groups have existed in every 
region of the world, and religiously affiliated terrorist groups have been based on a 
variety of different religions. See Burgess, supra note 8 (discussing terrorist or 
terrorist-like regimes in France, Russia, Ireland, various African nations, and the 
United States, among others); see also supra note 9. Further, simply because some 
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Hamas,16 which emerged from the Egypt-based Muslim Brotherhood 
in 1987 at the start of the First Intifada, a mass Palestinian uprising 
against Israeli control in Gaza, the West Bank, and East Jerusalem.17 
Hamas has political, humanitarian, and “military” (terrorist) 
branches.18 The organization refuses to recognize the State of Israel, 
and the terrorist branch carries out suicide bombings, rocket 
launchings, and ground attacks in Israeli territories to achieve its goal 
of eliminating the Israeli state.19 Hamas generally recruits its terrorists 
by targeting deeply religious young men who have an intense hatred of 
Israel. After a suicide bomber dies, Hamas offers his family between 
                                                                                                                   
Islamic terrorist groups engage in abhorrent violence by no means implies that all 
Muslims do so, or even that they support terrorism. The reality is quite the contrary. 
For a vast collection of American Muslims’ condemnations of terrorism post-
September 11th, see COUNCIL ON AMERICAN ISLAMIC RELATIONS, RESPONSE TO 
SEPTEMBER 11, 2001 ATTACKS (Mar. 28, 2007), 
http://www.cair.com/Portals/0/pdf/September_11_statements.pdf. 
16 Hamas was designated as a terrorist organization by President Clinton in 
1995, pursuant to Executive Order 12,947. Exec. Order 12,947, 60 Fed. Reg. 5079, 
5081 (Jan. 25, 1995) (listing a dozen “terrorist organizations which threaten to 
disrupt the Middle East peace process”). Hamas was later designated as a “foreign 
terrorist organization” (FTO) in 1997 pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1189, which created a 
procedure by which the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the 
Attorney General, may designate an organization as an FTO. Hamas is now also on 
the list of Specially Designated Terrorists and Specially Designated Global 
Terrorists. See Alphabetical List of Blocked Persons, Specially Designated 
Nationals, SDTs, SDGTs, Foreign Terrorist Organizations & Specially Designated 
Narcotics Traffickers, 31 C.F.R. Ch. V, App. A (2008). This list was created after 
the September 11th terrorist attacks when President George W. Bush signed 
Executive Order 13,224. See Exec. Order No. 13,224, 66 Fed. Reg. 49,089 (Sept. 23, 
2001). 
17 See Council on Foreign Relations, Hamas (Jan. 7, 2009), 
http://www.cfr.org/publication/8968. But see Berman & Laitin, supra note 14, at 7 
(citing 1988 as the founding date of Hamas). 
18 See Council on Foreign Relations, supra note 17. Hamas’s military branch is 
known as the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigade. Id. 
19 See id. Hamas’s “founding charter commits the group to the destruction of 
Israel, the replacement of the [Palestinian Authority] with an Islamist state on the 
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three and five thousand dollars and “assures them their son died a 
martyr in holy jihad.”20 
 Hamas won the Palestinian Authority’s general election in 2006, 
becoming “the largest and most influential Palestinian militant 
movement.”21 The group’s humanitarian wing funds schools, 
orphanages, hospitals and other medical facilities, and even sports 
leagues; Hamas’s social services work has led to its increased 
popularity and, in part, likely explains its rise to political power.22 
Much of Hamas’s funding comes from private donors in oil-rich 
Persian Gulf states such as Saudi Arabia, as well as from Muslim 
charities in the United States, Canada, and Western Europe that 
“funnel money into Hamas-backed social service groups.”23 
 In 2002, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit confronted the harsh realities of terrorism in a case of first 
impression in Boim v. Quranic Literacy Institute (Boim I).  There the 
parents of David Boim, a teenage U.S. citizen who was killed in Israel 
during an alleged Hamas attack, sued several organizations under 18 
U.S.C. § 2333 for purportedly providing financial contributions to 
Hamas.24 The Boim I panel revisited the case in 2007 (Boim II);25 in 
2008, the Seventh Circuit reheard the case en banc, and issued what is 
likely to be its final opinion in this case (Boim III).26 However, given 
the increasing effects of international terrorism on American citizens, 
courts throughout the country are, unfortunately, quite likely to see a 
growing number of § 2333 cases in the near future. In fact, the 
Supreme Court of the United States may even speak to this scarcely 
                                                 
20 Id. 
21 See id. 
22 See id. 
23 Id. 
24 See Boim v. Quranic Literacy Inst., 291 F.3d 1000, 1001, 1003 (7th Cir. 
2002) [hereinafter Boim I].  
25 See Boim v. Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev., Nos. 05-1815, 05-1816, 
05-1821, 05-1822, at 4 (7th Cir. 2007), 
http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/tmp/PU0UUODT.pdf. [hereinafter Boim II]. 
26 See 549 F.3d 685, 687 (7th Cir. 2008) (en banc) [hereinafter Boim III]. 
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addressed civil statute,27 as some of the parties to the Boim litigation 
have filed petitions for a writ of certiorari.28 
 Given the relevance of § 2333, it is important to understand its 
overall context and to determine the most legally sound framework of 
liability under this civil statute—particularly as it relates to holding 
financiers of terrorism liable, as in the Boim litigation.29 Accordingly, 
Part I of this Note provides an overview, including the history and 
purpose, of the anti-terrorism statutory scheme. Part II discusses the 
facts, legal theories, and procedural history of the Boim litigation, 
which is seen by other courts as the “critical authority” on § 2333.30 
Part III addresses two distinct frameworks of liability under § 2333 by 
reviewing the Boim III majority opinion, written by Judge Posner, and 
one of the dissenting opinions, written by Judge Rovner. Finally, by 
analyzing the infirmities of both judges’ opinions, Part IV develops a 
legally sound framework for other courts—including the Supreme 
Court, if applicable—to adopt when addressing § 2333 donor liability 
cases. 
 
I. THE ANTI-TERRORISM STATUTORY SCHEME 
 
 Throughout the late 1980s and 1990s, Congress enacted a 
patchwork of legislation aimed at combating terrorism by creating 
both criminal and civil liability. First, the Antiterrorism Act of 199031 
                                                 
27 See Peter M. Mansfield, Terrorism and a Civil Cause of Action: Boim, 
Ungar, and Joint Torts, 3 CHI.-KENT J. INT’L & COMP. L., at *33 (2003), 
http://www.kentlaw.edu/jicl/articles/spring2003/Peter%20M.%20Mansfield.doc. 
28 See Boim III, 549 F.3d 685, petition for cert. filed, 77 U.S.L.W. 3657 (U.S. 
May 1, 2009) (No. 08-1441). 
29 See, e.g., Boim I, 291 F.3d at 1003–04. 
30 Brief of Appellee at 17, Boim v. Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev., Nos. 
05-1815, 05-1816, 05-1821, 05-1822 (7th Cir. 2007), 
http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/tmp/PU0UUODT.pdf. [hereinafter Brief of Appellee] 
(asserting that, as of 2005, Boim I had been followed by at least forty-four other 
courts in interpreting § 2333). 
31 Pub. L. No. 101-519, § 132, 104 Stat. 2250 (1990). This entire Act was 
repealed in 1991 because of a “technical deficiency.” See Boim I, 291 F.3d 1000, 
1008 n.6 (7th Cir. 2002); 137 CONG. REC. S4511-04 (daily ed. Apr. 16, 1991) 
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(the Act), codified in part at 18 U.S.C. § 2333, provides a civil cause 
of action to American victims of international terrorism: 
Any national of the United States injured in his or her 
person, property, or business by reason of an act of 
international terrorism, or his or her estate, survivors, or 
heirs, may sue therefore in any appropriate district court of 
the United States and shall recover threefold the damages 
he or she sustains and the cost of the suit, including 
attorney’s fees.32 
 The Act defines the term “international terrorism” in § 2331(1) as 
activities that: 
(A) involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that 
are a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of 
any State. . .; 
(B) appear to be intended— 
 (i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; 
 (ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation 
or coercion; or 
 (iii) to affect the conduct of a government by assassination 
or kidnapping; and 
(C) occur primarily outside the territorial jurisdiction of the 
United States, or transcend national boundaries in terms of 
the means by which they are accomplished. . .33 
 The legislative history of §§ 2331 and 2333 “evidences an intent 
by Congress to codify general common law tort principles and to 
extend civil liability for acts of international terrorism to the full 
                                                                                                                   
(statement of Sen. Grassley) (noting that the Act had been inadvertently enacted 
“[d]ue to an enrolling error”). In 1992, however, the provisions of the Act were 
reenacted as part of the Federal Courts Administration Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-
572, 106 Stat. 4506 (1992). See Boim I, 291 F.3d at 1008 n.6. 
32 18 U.S.C. § 2333(a) (2006). 
33 18 U.S.C. § 2331(1) (2000). Section 2331(1) was amended by the USA 
PATRIOT Act of 2001. See Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 802, 115 Stat. 272, 376 (2001) 
(amending § 2331(1)(B)(iii) to read “to affect the conduct of a government by mass 
destruction, assassination, or kidnapping”) (emphasis added). 
 378
7
Rowe: Ending Terrorism with Civil Remedies: <em>Boim v. Holy Land Found
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2009
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                           Volume 4, Issue 2                       Spring 2009 
reaches of traditional tort law.”34 In addition, as the Seventh Circuit 
noted in Boim I, “[t]he statute clearly is meant to reach beyond those 
persons who themselves commit the violent act that directly causes the 
injury.”35 Furthermore, the Senate’s Report states that these provisions 
“and the imposition of liability at any point along the causal chain of 
terrorism. . .interrupt, or at least imperil, the flow of money.”36 Thus, 
the Act’s legislative history also indicates quite clearly that the purpose 
of § 2333 was to cut off, or significantly impair, vital sources of 
terrorist funding by allowing terrorism victims and their families to 
pursue private actions to recover for their injuries. To illustrate, at a 
Senate hearing on the legislation, Joseph Morris, General Counsel to 
the United States Information Agency, stated: “[A]nything that could 
be done to deter money-raising in the United States, money laundering 
in the United States, the repose of assets in the United States, and so 
on, would not only help benefit victims, but would also help deter 
terrorism.”37 
 The “criminal counterparts”38 to the civil provisions of the Act 
were added in 1994 and 1996, when Congress enacted 18 U.S.C. 
§§ 2339A and 2339B, respectively.39 In relevant part, § 2339A 
                                                 
34 Boim I, 291 F.3d at 1010 (citing 137 CONG. REC. S4511-04 (statement of 
Sen. Grassley)); Antiterrorism Act of 1990: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts 
and Administrative Practice of Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong. 136 (1990) 
[hereinafter Senate Hearing] (statement of Joseph Morris, General Counsel, United 
States Information Agency). 
35 Boim I, 291 F.3d at 1011. 
36 S. REP. NO. 102-342, at 22 (1992) [hereinafter SENATE REPORT]. 
37 Senate Hearing, supra note 34, at 79; see also id. at 17 (statement of Alan 
Kreczko, Deputy Legal Advisor, Department of State) (“The existence of such a 
cause of action. . .may deter terrorist groups from maintaining assets in the United 
States, from benefitting from investments in the U.S., and from soliciting funds 
within the U.S.”). 
38 Boim I, 291 F.3d at 1012. 
39 See Pub. L. No. 103-322, Title XII, § 120005(a), 108 Stat. 2022 (1994) 
(§ 2339A); Pub. L. No. 104-132, Title III, § 303(a), 110 Stat. 1250 (1996) 
(§ 2339B). Section 2339C is an additional criminal component in this statutory 
scheme that criminalizes the financing of terrorism “by any means, directly or 
indirectly,” if the financing is provided with the intent or knowledge that the funds 
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criminalizes “provid[ing] material support or resources [to 
terrorists]. . ., knowing or intending that they are to be used in 
preparation for, or in carrying out, a violation of” a number of violent 
crimes,40 including 18 U.S.C. § 2332, which criminalizes the killing 
of, or the attempting or conspiring to kill, a United States national 
outside the United States.41 Section 2339B extends criminal liability to 
anyone who “knowingly provides material support or resources to a 
foreign terrorist organization, or attempts to do so.”42 Furthermore, 
§ 2339A defines “material support or resources” to include the 
provision of currency or financial securities, as well as training, 
                                                                                                                   
are to be used for carrying out an “act intended to cause death or serious bodily 
injury to a civilian. . .” See 18 U.S.C. § 2339C(a)(1) (2006). However, § 2339C is 
beyond the scope of this Note, as it was enacted years after David Boim’s death and, 
thus, was not relevant to the Boim litigation. See Pub. L. No. 107-197, Title II, 
§ 202(a), 116 Stat. 724 (2002); Boim III, 549 F.3d 685, 687 (7th Cir. 2008) (noting 
that David Boim was killed in 1996). Nevertheless, when §§ 2339A and 2339B are 
referenced throughout the remainder of this Note, § 2339C is implicitly included, as 
well. 
40 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(a) (2006). Despite the disjunctive “or” in § 2339A(a) 
(“knowing or intending”), courts have interpreted this language as requiring intent. 
See Humanitarian Law Project v. Gonzales, 380 F. Supp. 2d 1134, 1146 (C.D. Cal. 
2005), aff’d, Humanitarian Law Project v. Mukasey, 552 F.3d 916 (9th Cir. 2009); 
see also Linde v. Arab Bank, PLC, 384 F. Supp. 2d 571, 586 (E.D.N.Y. 2005). 
41 18 U.S.C. § 2332(a)–(b) (2006). In addition to criminalizing the knowing or 
intentional provision of material support or resources with respect to killing a United 
States national outside the United States, § 2339A also criminalizes this conduct 
with respect to thirty other violent crimes associated with terrorism. See id. § 2339A; 
Boim I, 291 F.3d at 1013 n.11 (listing the “diverse and extensive list” of crimes 
covered by § 2339A). 
42 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1) (2006). The term “foreign terrorist organization” is 
defined according to the lengthy provisions set forth in 8 U.S.C. § 1189 (2006). In 
2004, § 2339B(a)(1) was amended by adding the following: “To violate this 
paragraph, a person must have knowledge that the organization is a designated 
terrorist organization. . ., that the organization has engaged or engages in terrorist 
activity. . ., or that the organization has engaged or engages in terrorism. . .” By 
adding this amendment, Congress clarified that criminal liability attaches as long as 
the defendant had knowledge of any one of the three possible characteristics of the 
donee organization. See Humanitarian Law Project, 380 F. Supp. 2d at 1147. 
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facilities, weapons, and “other physical assets, except medicine or 
religious materials.”43 
 




 In 1996, David Boim, a Jewish teenager who was both a United 
States and an Israeli citizen, was attending high school in Israel.44 In 
May of that year, as David and some of his classmates were waiting at 
a bus stop near Jerusalem, a car pulled off the road, stopping a short 
distance away from the group of students.45 One or more of the car’s 
occupants opened fire; David was shot in the head, and died within 
hours.46 David’s murder was later attributed to two alleged members 
of the terrorist wing of Hamas.47 
 In an effort to keep “even one nickel” from Hamas that might be 
used for terrorist acts like the one that took David’s life,48 David’s 
parents, Joyce and Stanley Boim, filed suit in 2000 pursuant to 
                                                 
43 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b). Section 2339B also adopts this definition of “material 
support or resources.” For a discussion of whether some of the activities included in 
this definition are void for vagueness, see generally Humanitarian Law Project, 552 
F.3d 916. 
44 Boim III, 549 F.3d 685, 687 (7th Cir. 2008); Boim II, Nos. 05-1815, 05-
1816, 05-1821, 05-1822, at 4 (7th Cir. 2007), 
http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/tmp/PU0UUODT.pdf.. 
45 Boim II, at 5. 
46 Id. 
47 Id. at 5–6. Whether the Boims had proven that Hamas was, in fact, 
responsible for David’s death was contested throughout the Boim litigation, except 
as to two defendants who conceded that Hamas was responsible. See Boim v. 
Quranic Literacy Inst., 340 F. Supp. 2d 885, 899 (N.D. Ill. 2004) (finding a sufficient 
factual basis for determining that Hamas was responsible for the attack); see also 
Boim II, at 77–78 (vacating the district court’s judgment with respect to one 
defendant on the basis that the court, sua sponte, determined that Hamas was 
responsible for David’s murder). 
48 Boim II, at 7. 
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§ 2333.49 In that civil action in the United States District Court for the 
Northern District of Illinois, the Boims named as defendants not only 
Amjad Hinawi and Khalil Tawfiq Al-Sharif—the two men allegedly 
responsible for David’s death50—but also several individuals and non-
profit organizations with alleged ties to Hamas.51 
 Two of the named organizational defendants were the Holy Land 
Foundation (HLF) and the Quranic Literacy Institute (QLI), which the 
Boims claimed are the main fronts for Hamas in the United States, and 
whose “allegedly humanitarian functions mask their core mission of 
raising and funneling money and other resources to Hamas operatives 
in support of terrorist activities.”52 Specifically, the Boims alleged that 
because it is illegal to provide financial support to foreign terrorist 
organizations, the money they provide “flows through a series of 
complicated transactions, changing hands a number of times, and 
being commingled with funds from the front organizations’ legitimate 
charitable and business dealings.”53 
 Defendant HLF adamantly maintains that it is one of the most 
prominent relief organizations serving the humanitarian needs of the 
Palestinian people in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.54 In fact, a 
significant portion of the funds that HLF allegedly provided to Hamas 
was actually given to various charitable entities that are controlled by 
Hamas, such as a hospital in Gaza.55 Nevertheless, its executive 
director admitted to being a Hamas activist and that some of HLF’s 
money was channeled to Hamas.56 In December 2001, HLF was added 
to the U.S. government’s “Specially Designated Terrorist” list,57 
resulting in the issuance of a blocking order freezing HLF’s assets and 
                                                 
49 Boim III, 549 F.3d at 687; Boim II, at 7. 
50 Boim I, 291 F.3d 1000, 1002 (7th Cir. 2002). 
51 Boim II, at 7. 
52 Boim I, 291 F.3d at 1003. 
53 Id. at 1004. 
54 Boim v. Quranic Literacy Inst., 340 F. Supp. 2d 885, 896 (N.D. Ill. 2004). 
55 Boim III, 549 F.3d 685, 706 (7th Cir. 2008).  
56 Boim I, 291 F.3d at 1003; Boim, 340 F. Supp. 2d at 896. 
57 See discussion supra note 16. 
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accounts.58 HLF challenged this administrative designation and 
blocking order on various statutory and constitutional grounds in the 
District Court for the District of Columbia, but the district court found 
substantial support for the designation.59 On appeal, the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed, noting that the 
record evidence established that “HLF’s role in the funding of Hamas 
and of its terrorist activities is incontrovertible.”60  
 Defendant QLI is an Illinois not-for-profit corporation that 
translates and publishes sacred Islamic texts.61 Two of QLI’s 
principals claim that “QLI’s major undertaking and central purpose is 
the ‘Quran Project,’ ‘an entirely new translation of the Quran, based 
on a careful and scholarly review and analysis of every single word o




                                                
62 The Boims alleged that, regardle
any claimed legitimate purpose, QLI also knowingly provided, and 
aided and abetted others in providing, material support to Ham 63
 The American Muslim Society (AMS) and the Islamic 
Association for Palestine (IAP), two other named defendants, were 
also alleged fronts for Hamas.64 AMS and IAP are, apparently, alter 
 
58 See Boim, 340 F. Supp. 2d at 893. 
59 See Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev. v. Ashcroft, 219 F. Supp. 2d 57, 74 
(D.D.C. 2002). 
60 Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev. v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 156, 165 (D.C. 
Cir. 2003). It should also be noted that in 2004, the United States government 
indicted HLF and several of its principals for, among several other crimes, providing 
and conspiring to provide material support to Hamas, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2339B(a)(1). See Boim II, at 9. In November of 2008, HLF and its principals were 
found guilty of these charges. United States v. Holy Land Found. For Relief & Dev., 
No. 3:04-CR-240-P (N.D. Tex. Nov. 24, 2008), 2008 WL 5240652 (jury verdict). 
61 Boim I, 291 F.3d at 1003. 
62 Boim, 340 F. Supp. 2d at 927. 
63 Id. An in-depth FBI investigation of QLI led to the initiation of a civil 
forfeiture action, whereby the United States successfully seized funds that QLI had 
“transferred to financial institutions within the United States from abroad with the 
intent to support the international terrorist activities of the HAMAS organization in 
violation of the Money Laundering Control Act of 1986.” See United States v. One 
1997 E35 Ford Van, 50 F. Supp. 2d 789, 792 (N.D. Ill. 1999) (citation omitted). 
64 Boim v. Quranic Literacy Inst., 127 F. Supp. 2d 1002, 1007 (N.D. Ill. 2001). 
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egos65 and were considered to be essentially one entity throughout the 
majority of the litigation.66 The ostensible purpose of AMS is 
“advancing a just, comprehensive, and eternal solution to the cause of 
the Palestine [sic] people through political, social, and educational 
efforts.”67 Nevertheless, the Boims alleged that AMS provided various 
types of support and resources to Hamas; for example, AMS 
participated in a 1993 meeting, during which FBI surveillance 
revealed that the attendees discussed with Hamas officials various 
ways of continuing their support for Hamas.68 Likewise, AMS invited 
pro-Hamas speakers to participate in their annual conferences, one 
which “featured a veiled Hamas terrorist as a guest speaker.”69 The 
Boims also alleged that AMS provided financial support to Hamas by 
funneling money to HLF which, in turn, provided funds to Hamas.70 
 Finally, the Boims named as a defendant Mohammed Abdul 
Hamid Khalil Salah, who is allegedly the admitted U.S.-based leader 
of Hamas’s terrorist wing.71 Salah was nominally employed by QLI as 
a computer analyst from the late 1980s through 1993.72 In January 
                                                 
65 Boim III, 549 F.3d 685, 687–88 (7th Cir. 2008). 
66 See Boim II, Nos. 05-1815, 05-1816, 05-1821, 05-1822, at 9 (7th Cir. 2007), 
http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/tmp/PU0UUODT.pdf.; Boim, 340 F. Supp. 2d at 906 
(noting that IAP and AMS “joined forces” in both their Answer to the Complaint and 
their joint motion for summary judgment). Accordingly, AMS and IAP will be 
referred to jointly as “AMS” throughout this Note. 
67 Boim II, at 9. 
68 See id. at 50. 
69 Id. at 51. 
70 Id. at 9. 
71 Boim v. Quranic Literacy Institute, 127 F. Supp. 2d 1002, 1006 (N.D. Ill. 
2001). There were also several other defendants who, for various reasons, were no 
longer part of the Boim III appeal and decision. See Boim, 340 F. Supp. 2d at 891–
92.  
72 Boim, 340 F. Supp. 2d at 927. QLI alleged that Salah was not actually an 
employee, but rather only a volunteer. Id. However, QLI admitted that it had 
arranged for Salah to receive a $3,000 monthly payment from Yassin Kadi, “who 
QLI characterizes as a ‘Saudi Arabian philanthropist.’” Id. As the district court 
noted, “[a]t least since October 12, 2001, the United States government has 
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1993, the Israeli government arrested and charged Salah with being an 
active member of and performing services for Hamas, among other 
things; Salah pleaded guilty to these charges, and was incarcerated in 
Israel until November 1997.73 During Salah’s incarceration, he 
admitted in a handwritten statement to other prisoners that he had 
channeled money for Hamas operations.74 Additionally, the United 
States government added Salah to its Specially Designated Terrorist 
list75 in 1995.76 Salah returned to the United States in 1997, after he 
was released from Israeli custody.77 
 
B. Theories of Liability and Procedural History 
 
 The four organizational defendants and Salah moved to dismiss 
the Boims’ complaint, arguing that the Boims’ claim sought to impose 
aiding and abetting liability, which was not a basis for liability under 
§ 2333.78 In other words, the defendants claimed that, even if they had 
provided financial or other support to Hamas, they could not be held 
                                                                                                                   
characterized Mr. Kadi quite differently: as of that date, he is a ‘Specially 
Designated Terrorist.’” Id. at 927 n.9. 
73 Boim II, at 7–8; Boim, 340 F. Supp. 2d at 917–18. 
74 Boim, 340 F. Supp. 2d at 918, 920. 
75 See discussion supra note 16. 
76 Boim II, at 8. 
77 Boim v. Quranic Literacy Institute, 127 F. Supp. 2d 1002, 1006 (N.D. Ill. 
2001). The United States also seized funds and assets belonging to Salah in the same 
civil forfeiture proceeding brought against QLI. See discussion supra note 63. 
Furthermore, in 2004, a federal grand jury indicted Salah for: (1) violating the 
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d); 
(2) knowingly providing and attempting to provide material support and resources to 
Hamas, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2339B; and (3) attempting to obstructing justice 
by giving false and misleading answers to interrogatories posted by the Boims in the 
Boim litigation, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1503. See Boim II, 511 F.3d at 8. The 
United States government dropped the § 2339B charge before trial, and in February 
2007, a jury acquitted Salah of the RICO charge; however, the jury did convict him 
of the obstruction of justice charge. See id. In July 2007, Salah was sentenced to 
twenty-one months in prison. See id. 
78 Boim, 127 F. Supp. 2d at 1010. 
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civilly liable for David’s murder.79 In January 2001, the district court 
denied the motions, holding that § 2333 permitted a cause of action 
based on an aiding and abetting theory of liability.80 The district 
court’s rationale for its ruling was based almost exclusively on 
statutory interpretation, as there was literally no precedent involving 
§ 2333 claims—let alone those against alleged financiers of 
terrorism.81 The following month, at the request of QLI and HLF, the 
district court certified three questions for interlocutory appeal to the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1292(b):  
(1) does funding, simpliciter, of an international terrorist 
organization constitute an act of terrorism under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2331?;  
(2) does 18 U.S.C. § 2333 incorporate the definitions of 
international terrorism found in 18 U.S.C. § 2339A and 
2339B?; and 
                                                 
79 See Boim II, at 11 (“[W]hat has been vigorously disputed from the inception 
of this litigation is whether and under what circumstances persons and groups who 
allegedly have provided money and other support to Hamas (directly and indirectly) 
may also be liable for David’s murder.”). 
80 Boim, 127 F. Supp. 2d at 1018. 
81 See id. at 1011–29. After Boim was initially filed, and throughout its lengthy 
stay in the district court and the Seventh Circuit, other cases were brought under 
§ 2333; however, the plaintiffs in the majority of these cases sued the terrorist 
organizations themselves, as well as the foreign governments who had allegedly 
allowed or supported terrorist activities occurring in their jurisdiction. See, e.g., 
Estates of Ungar v. Palestinian Auth., 315 F. Supp. 2d 164 (D.R.I. 2004), aff’d sub 
nom. Ungar v. Palestine Liberation Org., 402 F.3d 274 (1st Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 
546 U.S. 1034 (2005); Biton v. Palestinian Interim Self-Gov’t. Auth., 310 F. Supp. 
2d 172 (D.D.C. 2004); Knox v. Palestine Liberation Org., 306 F. Supp. 2d 424 
(S.D.N.Y. 2004). In 2005, a group of United States citizens and family members of 
individuals who were victims of Hamas terrorist attacks in Israel brought a § 2333 
action against a Jordanian bank; the plaintiffs claimed that the bank had provided 
material support to Hamas, as well as charities that it knew were merely fronts for 
Hamas, by acting as the exclusive administrator responsible for paying the families 
of suicide bombers. Linde v. Arab Bank, PLC, 384 F. Supp. 2d 571, 575–78 
(E.D.N.Y. 2005). This case is currently in the pre-trial stages. 
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(3) does a civil cause of action lie under 18 U.S.C. § 2331 
and 18 U.S.C. § 2333 for aiding and abetting international 
terrorism?82 
 Judges Rovner, Wood, and Evans heard the appeal, and in a case 
of first impression,83 the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s 
denial of the defendants’ motion to dismiss, answering in the negative 
to the first certified question, but in the affirmative to the second and 
third certified questions.84 
 The case then proceeded through discovery in the district court, 
after which each defendant moved for summary judgment, and the 
Boims cross-moved for partial summary judgment, though only on the 
issue of liability and not with respect to QLI.85 The district court 
granted summary judgment in favor of the Boims as to the liability of 
HLF, AMS, and Salah.86 Because the district court held that there were 
genuine issues of material fact existing in the claim against QLI, the 
court denied summary judgment as to that defendant,87 and the case 
went before a jury on the issues of QLI’s liability and the amount of 
damages to be awarded from all the liable defendants.88 After a one-
week trial, a jury found QLI liable under § 2333, and assed $52 
million in damages against all the defendants, jointly and severally.89 
Pursuant to § 2333, the judge then trebled the damages—totaling $156 
million—and awarded attorneys’ fees.90 
                                                 
82 Boim v. Quranic Literacy Inst., No. 00 C 2905 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 22, 2001). 
83 See Boim I, 291 F.3d 1000, 1001 (7th Cir. 2002) (“In this interlocutory 
appeal, we are asked to consider the viability of a claim brought under the never-
tested 18 U.S.C. § 2333.”); id. at 1009 (“No court has yet considered the meaning 
and scope of sections 2331 and 2333, and so we write upon a tabula rasa.”). 
84 See id. at 1001, 1011, 1015, 1021. 
85 Boim v. Quranic Literacy Inst., 340 F. Supp. 2d 885, 892, 894 (N.D. Ill. 
2004).  
86 Id. at 931. 
87 See id. at 929–31.  
88 Boim v. Quranic Literacy Inst., No. 00 C 2905, 2005 WL 433463, at *1 
(N.D. Ill. Feb. 18, 2005); see Boim, 340 F. Supp. 2d at 931. 
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 It is worth noting—even if only for its novelty—the rather odd 
actions (or lack thereof) on the part of the defendants and their 
attorneys at trial. First, HLF’s attorney informed the court that it had 
“elected not to participate in—or even attend—the liability phase of 
the trial” because of the court’s prior ruling on summary judgment, 
and because its assets were already seized and frozen by the United 
States government.91 Counsel for AMS and Salah subsequently 
followed suit.92 Although counsel for all three of these defendants 
notified the court that they might attend and participate in the damages 
phase of the trial, “none of them did.”93 Second, after the court denied 
QLI’s motion for summary judgment, QLI’s counsel moved for a 
continuance of the trial date, claiming that, “because his client was a 
relatively minor player,” he had intended to “ride the coattails of the 
other defendants’ defenses.”94 However, when the other defendants’ 
liabilities were decided on summary judgment, and because they had 
elected not to participate in the trial, QLI’s attorney argued that “he 
could not reasonably be expected to carry the ball on his own without 
being given several more months to prepare.”95 After the court denied 
the motion,96 QLI’s attorney moved to withdraw from the case; this 
motion was also denied, “as it was quite clearly a backdoor attempt to 
push back the trial date.”97 Finally, on the morning of trial, QLI filed a 
“Notice of Non-Participation,” informing the court that QLI and its 
counsel would attend the trial, but would not actively participate.98 
                                                 





96 The court’s reason for denying the motion was: “given that the trial date had 
been set for at least six months, and given that the Boims had moved for summary 
judgment against all of the defendants except QLI, [its counsel] had ample notice 
that he might be the sole defendant to survive to trial.” Id. 
97 Id. 
98 Id. at *2. The magistrate judge presiding in front of the trial advised QLI’s 
counsel and its principal that it believed this plan was “both risky and foolish,” and 
that it was QLI’s counsel’s responsibility to defend QLI—not the court’s. Id. They 
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Accordingly, at trial, QLI’s counsel declined to participate in jury 
selection; make an opening statement; cross-examine witnesses; object 
to the admission of exhibits; make a closing argument; and participate 
in the jury instruction conference.99 Perhaps even more shockingly, 
after the jury found QLI liable and awarded damages to the Boims, 
QLI filed a motion seeking judgment as a matter of law—or, in the 
alternative, a new trial.100 The court aptly denied these motions, 
explaining that “it is hard to believe that these defendants would 
actually expect the Court to conduct another trial when they did not 
even bother to show up for the first trial.”101 
 After this series of events, the defendants again appealed to the 
Seventh Circuit, where the case was heard by the same panel of judges 
that heard the interlocutory appeal—Judges Rovner, Wood, and 
Evans.102 In an opinion written by Judge Rovner, the panel vacated the 
judgment and remanded the case to the district court to reassess 
liability.103 Judge Evans concurred with the court’s reversal as to HLF, 
but otherwise dissented.104 The Seventh Circuit then granted the 
Boims’ petition for rehearing en banc, vacating the panel’s decision.105 
 
III. BOIM: THE EN BANC OPINION 
 
 On rehearing en banc, the court affirmed the district court’s 
judgment in part, and reversed and remanded in part.106 The en banc 
majority opinion was written by Judge Posner.107 Judge Rovner filed 
                                                                                                                   
carried on as planned, however, because they were “determined not to participate in 
the trial.” Id.  
99 Id. 
100 Id. 
101 Id. at *6. 
102 Boim II, Nos. 05-1815, 05-1816, 05-1821, 05-1822, at 1 (7th Cir. 2007), 
http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/tmp/PU0UUODT.pdf.. 
103 Id. at 91–93. 
104 Id. at 94. 
105 Boim III, 549 F.3d 685, 688 (7th Cir. 2008). 
106 Id. at 705. 
107 Id. at 687. 
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an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which she was 
joined by Judge Williams and joined in part by Judge Wood.108 
Likewise, Judge Wood filed an opinion concurring in part and 
dissenting in part, in which she was joined in part by Judges Rovner 
and Williams.109 Judges Rovner, Wood, and Williams were all 
generally in agreement as to the legal standards of liability under 
§ 2333 of the Act—which were, in some respects, quite different than 
those outlined by the majority.110 In the end, the only issue the full 
court agreed upon was that the judgment as to HLF should be reversed 
and remanded, because the court disagreed with the district court’s 
application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel.111 
 This Part separately addresses the Boim III en banc majority 
opinion written by Judge Posner and the dissenting opinion112 written 
by Judge Rovner.113 Although there were various other issues dividing 
the court that were important to the Boims’ case, this Part focuses on 
the issues which will most profoundly affect future courts’ analyses of 
similar cases: (1) whether § 2333 provides for primary or secondary 
liability; and (2) the elements required to prove liability against a 
donor or supporter of terrorism under § 2333. 
 
                                                 
108 See id. at 705, 705 n.1. 
109 See id. at 719, 719 n.1. 
110 Compare, e.g., id. at 689, 693, with id. at 708, 712. 
111 See id. at 706, 719–20. For a thorough discussion of why HLF could not be 
held liable based on collateral estoppel, see Boim II, Nos. 05-1815, 05-1816, 05-
1821, 05-1822, at 22–48 (7th Cir. 2007), 
http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/tmp/PU0UUODT.pdf.. 
112 Although Judge Rovner’s and Judge Wood’s opinions were opinions 
“concurring in part and dissenting in part,” the only holding with which Judges 
Rovner, Wood, and Williams concurred was that the district court improperly 
applied the doctrine of collateral estoppel to HLF. See id. at 706; id. at 719–20. 
Therefore, these opinions will be referred to simply as dissenting opinions. 
113 Because the two opinions written by Judge Rovner and Judge Wood 
basically espouse the same analysis and reasoning, but because Judge Rovner 
authored the two previous panel opinions, this Part focuses on their analysis as 
illustrated in Judge Rovner’s opinion. 
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A. Judge Posner’s Majority Opinion 
 
1. Primary vs. Secondary Liability 
 
 Breaking with the theory of liability that had formed the basis of 
the parties’ complaints and theories in the Boim litigation for 
approximately eight years, Judge Posner, writing for the en banc 
majority, first determined that § 2333 does not impose secondary 
liability on donors or supporters of terrorism.114 Thus, such individuals 
or organizations could not be held liable for aiding and abetting an act 
of international terrorism, as the district court and Seventh Circuit had 
each twice held.115 In reaching this conclusion, Judge Posner relied 
heavily on the Supreme Court’s decision in Central Bank of Denver v. 
First Interstate Bank of Denver.116 Judge Posner stated that the Court 
in Central Bank held that section 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange 
Act of 1934 did not provide for aiding and abetting liability “because 
                                                 
114 Boim III, 549 F.3d at 689. When the Boims initially filed their lawsuit, they 
argued that § 2333 created primary liability, and that these particular defendants 
themselves committed “an act of international terrorism.” Boim v. Quranic Literacy 
Inst., 127 F. Supp. 2d 1002, 1011 (N.D. Ill. 2001) (“According to plaintiffs’ theory, 
sponsoring violence by providing money or other material support that facilitates the 
recruiting and training of terrorists, enables the purchase of weapons or provides 
‘compensation’ to the families of terrorists who die in the attacks—knowing that the 
support will enable the terrorists to plan and carry out the bombing or shooting of 
others—is an ‘activity’ that ‘involves violent acts’ that are a violation of federal law 
and therefore meets the definition of ‘international terrorism’ in § 2331(1)(A).”). 
Alternatively, they argued that § 2333 extends liability to aiders and abettors of 
international terrorism, thereby creating secondary liability. Id. 
115 See Boim, 127 F. Supp. 2d 1002 (N.D. Ill. 2001) (denying defendants’ 
motions to dismiss on the grounds that secondary—or aiding and abetting—liability 
was viable basis for establishing liability under § 2333); Boim I, 291 F.3d 1000 
(answering in the affirmative to the certified question on this issue); Boim v. Quranic 
Literacy Inst., 340 F. Supp. 2d 885 (N.D. Ill. 2004) (granting summary judgment to 
the Boims on the issue of aiding and abetting liability); Boim II, Nos. 05-1815, 05-
1816, 05-1821, 05-1822, at 4 (7th Cir. 2007), 
http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/tmp/PU0UUODT.pdf. (reaffirming its holding in Boim 
I on this issue). 
116 511 U.S. 164 (1994). 
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it makes no reference to secondary liability.”117 According to Judge 
Posner’s reading of Central Bank, “statutory silence on the subject of 
secondary liability means there is none.”118 Therefore, as with section 
10(b), because § 2333 “does not mention aiders and abettors or other 
secondary actors,” § 2333 does not—in fact, cannot—impose 
secondary liability.119 
 Despite this reading of Central Bank, Judge Posner concluded that 
§ 2333 imposes primary liability on donors and supporters of 
terrorism—ensuring that such donors would not escape liability.120 
Judge Posner described this “alternative and more promising ground” 
for holding donors liable under § 2333 as one involving “a chain of 
explicit statutory incorporations by reference.”121 The first link in this 
chain is the statutory definition of international terrorism found in 
§ 2331(1).122 Applying that definition, the central question becomes: 
does providing financial support to a terrorist organization constitute 
“activities that. . .involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human 
life”?123 Although Judge Posner seemingly determined that this 
conduct by no means involved a “violent act,” he concluded that 
“[g]iving money to Hamas, like giving a loaded gun to a child. . ., is an 
                                                 
117 Boim III, 549 F.3d at 689 (citing Central Bank, 511 U.S. 164). 
118 Id. 
119 See id. 
120 See id. at 690. 
121 Id. 
122 Id. For § 2331(1)’s full definition of “international terrorism,” see supra 
text accompanying note 33. 
123 18 U.S.C. § 2331(1) (2006); see Boim III, 549 F.3d at 690. Although there 
are three sub-parts to § 2331(1)’s definition of “international terrorism,” the 
defendants never disputed that their alleged conduct satisfied sub-sections (B) and 
(C). See Boim v. Quranic Literacy Inst., 127 F. Supp. 2d 1002, 1012 n.7 (N.D. Ill. 
2001). One might question this decision, however. Surely, sub-section (C) is 
satisfied (activities that “transcend national boundaries in terms of the means by 
which they are accomplished”), but the defendants would have had at least a decent 
argument as to (B) (activities that “appear to be intended. . .to intimidate or coerce a 
civilian population” or “affect the conduct of a government. . .”). That is, it is at least 
debatable whether, to the objective observer, giving money even directly to Hamas 
“appears to be intended” to do any of the listed actions. 
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‘act dangerous to human life.’”124 Consequently, the first link to 
liability was in place. 
 The second link in the chain is § 2339A,125 because the conduct at 
issue must not only involve a violent act or an act dangerous to human 
life, but must also be a “violation of the criminal laws of the United 
States.”126 Section 2339A provides that an individual or organization 
that “provides material support or resources [to terrorists]. . ., knowing 
or intending that they are to be used in preparation for, or in carrying 
out, a violation of [18 U.S.C. § 2332],” is guilty of a federal crime.127 
The third link in the chain is thus § 2332, which “criminalizes the 
killing . . . , conspiring to kill, or inflicting bodily injury on, any 
American citizen outside the United States.”128 Accordingly, the entire 
“chain of incorporations by reference” was connected, and Judge 
Posner had established that individuals or organizations who provide 
financial support to terrorists can be held primarily liable under § 2333 
through the § 2331(1)–§ 2339A–§ 2332 chain of liability.129 
 It was at this point where Judge Posner discussed defendant 
Salah’s liability. Judge Posner determined that Salah could not have 
rendered material support to Hamas between the 1994 effective date of 
§ 2339A (the second link in the chain) and David Boim’s killing in 
1996, because he was in an Israeli prison from 1993 until 1997.130 
Therefore, the Seventh Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment 
against Salah.131 However, Judge Posner noted that most future cases 
will not likely be affected by this timing issue, because they will rarely 
involve donations or other material support that ceased before 1994, as 
was the case with Salah.132 
                                                 
124 Boim III, 549 F.3d at 690 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2331(1)(A)). 
125 Id. 
126 18 U.S.C. § 2331(1)(A). 
127 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(a) (2006). 
128 Boim III, 549 F.3d at 690 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2332 (2006)). 
129 See id. 
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2. Elements of Donor Liability Under § 2333 
 
 Judge Posner first explained that because § 2333 is a federal tort 
statute, the traditional tort requirements of “fault, state of mind, 
causation, and foreseeability” must be established; however, where, as 
here, “the primary liability is that of someone who aids someone else, 
so that functionally the primary violator is an aider and abettor or other 
secondary actor, a different set of principles comes into play.”133 
Furthermore, Judge Posner concluded that § 2333 implicitly creates an 
intentional tort, if for no other reason than because it provides for an 
automatic trebling of damages—and treble damages are punitive 
damages, which are imposed only if the defendant engaged in 
deliberate wrongdoing.134 Therefore, proof of the so-called “state of 
mind” requirement under § 2333 requires showing that the defendant 
either “knows that the organization engages in [terrorist] acts or is 
deliberately indifferent to whether it does or not, meaning that one 
knows there is a substantial probability that the organization engages 
in terrorism but one does not care.”135 
 Furthermore, because § 2333 creates an intentional tort, a plaintiff 
must prove that the actual defendant knew that the organization he 
was supporting was, in fact, a terrorist organization; that is, it is 
insufficient to prove that the average or reasonable person would have 
realized this—because “[t]hat would just be negligence.”136 Judge 
                                                 
133 Id. at 692. 
134 Id. 
135 Id. at 693 (emphasis added). According to Judge Posner, “deliberate 
indifference” meets the required “deliberate wrongdoing” standard of an intentional 
tort because deliberate indifference is “recklessness, and equivalent to recklessness is 
wantonness,” which is equivalent to intentional misconduct. See id. Additionally, 
Judge Posner referred to the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which states: “If the 
actor knows that the consequences are certain, or substantially certain, to result from 
his act, and still goes ahead, he is treated by the law as if he had in fact desired to 
produce the result.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A cmt. b (1965) 
[hereinafter RESTATEMENT (SECOND)]. 
136 Boim III, 549 F.3d at 693. 
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Posner further elaborated on the state of mind requirement by 
discussing risk, in terms of probability and magnitude.137 For instance, 
“the greater the risk, the more obvious it will be to the risk taker, 
enabling the trier of fact to infer the risk taker’s knowledge of the risk 
with greater confidence. . .”138 Moreover, even if the probability of 
harm is not great, it will be deemed “reckless” if it is excessive—
meaning substantial, relative to its gratuitousness.139 And, as the 
Seventh Circuit had previously recognized, “‘an activity is reckless 
when the potential harm that it creates. . .is wildly disproportionate to 
any benefits that the activity might be expected to confer.’”140  
 Judge Posner’s conclusion from all of this was that “[t]he mental 
element required to fix liability on a donor to Hamas is therefore 
present if the donor knows the character of that organization.”141 In 
other words, § 2333 does not require proof that the donor intended for 
his contribution to a terrorist organization to be used for terrorism per 
se.142 Therefore, “[a]nyone who knowingly contributes to the 
nonviolent wing of an organization that he knows to engage in 
terrorism is knowingly contributing to the organization’s terrorist 
activities.”143 From this rule, it follows that there is no “charity 
defense”; that is, an individual or organization cannot defend itself 
from liability simply on the ground that it earmarked its donation for 
humanitarian, charitable, or other non-terrorist activities.144 From 
Judge Posner’s point of view, allowing “benign intent” to be a defense 
                                                 
137 See id. at 694–95. 
138 Id. at 694. 
139 Id. at 695. 
140 Id. (quoting United States v. Boyd, 475 F.3d 875, 877 (7th Cir. 2007)).  
141 Id. Of course, one would assume from Judge Posner’s lengthy explanation 
that by “knows,” Judge Posner actually means “knows or is deliberately indifferent 
to.” See id. at 693; supra text accompanying note 135. 
142 See Boim III, 549 F.3d at 698–99. 
143 Id. at 698. 
144 See id. 
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would practically “eliminate donor liability except in cases in which 
the donor was foolish enough to admit his true intent.”145 
 Additionally, Judge Posner cited two other reasons for not 
requiring proof that the donor intended for his contribution to be used 
for terrorism per se. First, because money is fungible, there is no way 
to prevent organizations like Hamas from using money donated for 
non-terrorism purposes in carrying out its terrorist missions.146 
Second, “Hamas’ social welfare activities reinforce its terrorist 
activities,” both directly (for example, by providing financial 
assistance to the families of killed Hamas terrorists) and indirectly (for 
example, by boosting its image and popularity among Palestinians 
and, consequently, recruiting new generations of terrorists).147 
 In discussing the next required element, causation, Judge Posner 
illustrated multiple cases, examples, and hypotheticals to show that 
traditional but-for causation is not necessary, although some proof of 
causation is nonetheless required.148 Judge Posner began by discussing 
the familiar multiple-fire example to explain that the defendant’s 
tortious conduct need not have been a “necessary condition” (a but-for 
cause)149 of the resulting injury: “when two fires join and destroy the 
plaintiff’s property and each one would have destroyed it by itself and 
so was not a necessary condition. . .each of the firemakers (if 
negligent) is [nevertheless] liable to the plaintiff for having ‘caused’ 
the injury.”150 In this situation, neither defendant can escape liability 
                                                 
145 Id. at 698–99. Furthermore, such a defense “would also create a First 
Amendment Catch-22, as the only basis for inferring intent would in the usual case 
be a defendant’s public declarations of support for the use of violence to achieve 
political ends.” Id. at 699. 
146 Id. at 698. 
147 Id. (citing Justin Magouirk, The Nefarious Helping Hand: Anti-Corruption 
Campaigns, Social Service Provision, and Terrorism, 20 TERRORISM & POL. 
VIOLENCE 356 (2008); Berman & Laitin, supra note 14, at 7–10). 
148 See id. at 695–97. 
149 See Maxwell v. KPMG, LLP, 520 F.3d 713, 716 (7th Cir. 2008). 
150 Boim III, 549 F.3d at 695 (citing Kingston v. Chi. & N.W. Ry. Co., 211 
N.W. 913 (Wis. 1927)) (internal quotations omitted). 
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by proving that he was not a but-for cause of the injury,151 because 
each is nevertheless a sufficient condition of the resulting injury.152 
 Furthermore, even where the plaintiff cannot adequately prove 
which one of multiple defendants’ tortious conduct actually caused an 
injury, causation can still be established to hold those multiple 
defendants jointly and severally liable for the injury.153 Judge Posner 
also noted that an even more relaxed standard of causation can be 
acceptable where the tortious acts of several defendants, in 
conjunction, contributed to the plaintiff’s injury.154 For instance, 
multiple defendants are all liable if their tortious spilling of toxic 
waste damages the plaintiff’s property, even if it is impossible to 
determine which defendant actually caused the damage155—or even if 
the amount of pollution spilled by each defendant would have been too 
slight to have independently caused the damage.156 In these situations, 
                                                 
151 See id. at 695–96 (citing Cook v. Minneapolis, St. Paul & Sault Ste. Marie 
Ry., 74 N.W. 561, 564 (1898)); see also id. at 696 (citing PROSSER & KEETON ON 
THE LAW OF TORTS § 41, 266–67 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON]). 
As Judge Posner noted, “[t]ort law rejects this conclusion for the practical reason 
that tortious activity that produces harm would go unsanctioned otherwise.” Id. at 
696. 
152 See id. at 696 (“[T]he acts of each defendant are sufficient conditions of the 
resulting injury, though they are not necessary conditions (that is, they are not but-
for causes).”). 
153 See id. As Judge Posner explained, this was the rule established in the 
famous Summers v. Tice case, 
where two hunters negligently shot their rifles at the same time and a third
 hunter was hit by one of the bullets, [but] it could not be determined which
 hunter’s gun the bullet had come from and so it could not be proved by a
 preponderance of the evidence that either of the shooters was the injurer in
 either a sufficient-condition or a necessary-condition sense. . .Nevertheless
 both defendants were held jointly and severally liable to the injured person. 
Id. (citing Summers v. Tice, 199 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1948)). 
154 See id. 
155 Id. 
156 Id. at 696–97 (“Even if the amount of pollution caused by each party would 
be too slight to warrant a finding that any one of them had created a 
nuisance. . .‘[t]he single act itself becomes wrongful because it is done in the context 
 397
26
Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 4, Iss. 2 [2009], Art. 6
https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol4/iss2/6
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                           Volume 4, Issue 2                       Spring 2009 
a plaintiff must prove “only that there was a substantial probability” 
that any of the defendants’ tortious conduct was a cause.157 According 
to Judge Posner, proof that a defendant “helped to create a danger” is 
sufficient to hold him liable, and one who provides material support to 
a wrongful act is held responsible as having committed the act.158  
 Finally, as to proximate causation or “foreseeability,” Judge 
Posner acknowledged that the majority’s framework may allow for the 
imposition of liability on an organization that, for example, made a 
contribution in 1995 to a terrorist group that killed an American 
abroad fifty years later in 2045—as long as the donor had the required 
state of mind.159 Yet, to Judge Posner, imposing liability in this 
situation “would not be as outlandish, given the character of terrorism, 
as one might think.”160 
 When applying all the possible theories of causation to the Boims’ 
case, Judge Posner noted that it is irrelevant that David’s death cannot 
not be traced even indirectly to any particular defendant, because 
“[t]he knowing contributors as a whole would have significantly 
enhanced the risk of terrorist acts and thus the probability that [David] 
would be a victim. . .”161 It follows that this is true even if no single 
defendant’s contribution was large enough to fund the particular attack 
that led to his death.162 Aside from this explanation, as well as a 
discussion of evidentiary issues surrounding the plaintiffs’ proof that 
Hamas was responsible for David Boim’s murder,163 Judge Posner did 
not address the application of the causation standard to the Boims’ 
case. Rather, in applying his established framework, Judge Posner 
focused on the knowledge requirement, albeit only slightly more.  
                                                                                                                   
of what others are doing.’”) (quoting PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 151, at § 41, 
268). 
157 Id. at 697. 
158 Id. (citing Keel v. Hainline, 331 P.2d 397 (Okla. 1958)). 
159 Id. at 699–700. 
160 Id. at 700. 
161 Id. at 698. 
162 Id. 
163 Id. at 702–05. The evidentiary issues are beyond the scope of this Note. 
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 First, with respect to QLI, Judge Posner did not discuss how the 
Boims proved QLI’s requisite knowledge, but merely said that the jury 
was able to decide whether QLI had “knowingly provided material 
support to Hamas,” and that the jury found QLI liable.164 Second, 
although AMS may have provided other types of material support to 
Hamas, AMS’s only financial contributions were to HLF—not 
Hamas.165 Nevertheless, “the fact that [HLF] may not have known that 
Hamas was a terrorist organization (implausible is that is) would not 
exonerate [AMS],” because AMS apparently did know that Hamas 
was a terrorist organization;166 therefore, Judge Posner found that, by 
giving money to HLF, AMS “was deliberately funneling money to 
Hamas.”167 Moreover, it was no defense that AMS did not directly 
give material support to Hamas, but rather “launder[ed] donations 
through a chain of intermediate organizations.”168 To illustrate this 
point, Judge Posner gave the following example: “Donor A gives to 
innocent-appearing organization B which gives to innocent-appearing 
organization C which gives to Hamas. As long as A either knows or is 
reckless in failing to discover that donations to B end up with Hamas, 
A is liable.”169 
 Finally, Judge Posner explained that setting “the knowledge and 
causal requirement” any higher than the majority had “would be to 
invite money laundering, the proliferation of affiliated organizations, 
and two-track terrorism (killing plus welfare). Donor liability would 
be eviscerated, and the statute would be a dead letter.”170 
 
                                                 
164 Id. at 702. 
165 See id. at 701. 
166 Judge Posner did not specifically explain how AMS satisfied the 
“knowledge or deliberate indifference” state of mind requirement but merely stated 
that “[t]he activities of [AMS] are discussed at length in the district court’s second 
opinion.” Id. at 701 (citing Boim v. Quranic Literacy Inst., 340 F. Supp. 2d 885, 
906–13 (N.D. Ill. 2004)). 
167 Id. 
168 Id. at 701–02. 
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B. Judge Rovner’s Dissenting Opinion 
 
1. Primary vs. Secondary Liability 
 
 Judge Rovner concluded that what the defendants allegedly did in 
this case is not clearly conduct that falls within § 2331(1)’s definition 
of international terrorism and, thus, may not be a basis for primary 
liability.171 Although Judge Rovner agreed that the definition 
“certainly is broad enough to reach beyond bomb-throwers and 
shooters to include those who provide direct and intentional support to 
terrorists,” she argues that “it is far from clear that sending money to a 
Hamas-controlled charitable organization, for example, is on par with 
that type of direct support for terrorism.”172 Furthermore, Judge 
Rovner agreed that donating to Hamas’s humanitarian wing may 
indirectly aid terrorism by freeing up other Hamas funds to use for 
terrorism or by boosting Hamas’s image among prospective terrorists 
or other supporters.173 For example, if Hamas’s humanitarian wing 
receives more monetary donations than necessary to carry out its 
social services programs, Hamas leaders can then spill over the extra 
funds to augment its terrorist activities.174 However, Judge Rovner 
disagreed with Judge Posner’s conclusion that donations to Hamas-
affiliated entities—including donations that are earmarked and used 
for humanitarian purposes—can be characterized as “acts dangerous to 
human life.”175 Moreover, Judge Rovner believed that it is not 
“evident (to say the least)” that providing money to “a Hamas-
affiliated charity is an act that ‘appear[s] to be intended’ to have the 
sorts of coercive or intimidating effects on government policy or upon 
a civilian population as described in section 2331(1)(B).”176 
                                                 
171 Id. at 708. 
172 Id. 
173 Id. 
174 See id. 
175 See id. at 690, 708. 
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 Nevertheless, Judge Rovner concluded that the Boims could 
attempt to hold these defendants liable under a secondary liability 
theory.177 To begin, Judge Rovner disagreed with the defendants and 
Judge Posner that Central Bank precluded the Boims from proceeding 
on an aiding and abetting theory simply because § 2333 does not 
expressly provide for it.178 As noted above, the Court in Central Bank 
held that a private plaintiff may not maintain an aiding and abetting 
action under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 
because that statute did not proscribe giving aid to someone who 
violated the Act.179 In particular, the Court stated that “there is no 
general presumption” that a plaintiff may always sue both primary 
actors and aiders and abettors under federal civil statutes.180 
Therefore, where Congress does not express any intent to extend 
liability under a particular statute, a plaintiff may not sue those w
aid and abet violations of that statute.
ho 
 
aid and abet.”  
                                                
181 Yet, at the same time, Judge
Rovner did not read Central Bank as eliminating aiding and abetting 
liability in all federal civil cases except when the relevant statute 
contain the words “ 182
 In Judge Rovner’s view, there are four reasons why Central Bank 
is not determinative in deciding whether § 2333 provides for 
secondary liability. First, the issue in Central Bank was whether 
liability under an implied right of action could be extended to aiders 
 
177 Id. at 709 (“The secondary liability framework is a much more natural fit 
for what the defendants here are alleged to have done. . .”). This was also the 
conclusion of Judges Wood and Evans, the two other members of the panel in Boim I 
and Boim II, 291 F.3d 1000 (7th Cir. 2002); Nos. 05-1815, 05-1816, 05-1821, 05-
1822, at 4 (7th Cir. 2007), http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/tmp/PU0UUODT.pdf., as 
well as Judge Williams, who joined Judge Rovner’s dissent in Boim III, 549 F.3d at 
705. Although Judge Evans dissented in Boim II, he did not do so on the issue of 
primary versus secondary liability. See Boim II, at 94. 
178 See Boim I, 291 F.3d at 1019 (citing Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First 
Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164 (1994)). 
179 Cent. Bank, 511 U.S. at 177–78; see supra note 117 and accompanying 
text. 
180 Id. at 182. 
181 See id. at 183. 
182 Boim I, 291 F.3d at 1019. 
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and abettors, whereas § 2333 provides an express right of action.183 
Second, Congress did express an intent in the language and legislative 
history of § 2333 “to import general tort law principles, and those 
principles include aiding and abetting liability.”184 Third, Congress 
expressed its intention in § 2333 “to render civil liability at least as 
extensive as criminal liability,185 and criminal liability attaches to 
aiders and abettors of terrorism.”186 Fourth, failing to extend liability 
under § 2333 to aiders and abettors “is contrary to Congress’ stated 
purpose of cutting off the flow of money to terrorists at every point 
along the chain of causation.”187 Therefore, even though § 2333 does 
not contain the words “aid and abet,” it nevertheless extends liability 
to aiders and abettors, because the language, context, and legislative 
history of § 2333 indicate that Congress intended the statute to “extend 
                                                 
183 Id. Judge Rovner noted that, because the courts already had to infer an 
intent by Congress to create a private right of action under § 10(b), they were 
reluctant to “pile inference upon inference” to extend liability to aiders and abettors. 
Id. However, “no such stacking is required in section 2333.” Id. 
184 Id.; see, e.g., 137 CONG. REC. S4511-04 (daily ed. Apr. 16, 1991). 
185 Judge Rovner points out that § 2331(1)’s definition of “international 
terrorism” includes activities that “involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human 
life that are a violation of the criminal laws of the United States. . .” Boim I, 291 
F.3d at 1020 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2331(1) (2006)). Thus, “by incorporating 
violations of any criminal laws that involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human 
life, Congress was expressly including aiding and abetting to the extent that aiding 
and abetting ‘involves’ violence.” Id. 
186 Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2 (2006) (imposing criminal liability on 
“whoever. . .aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures. . .” the 
commission of a federal crime)). Since 18 U.S.C. § 2332 makes it a federal crime to 
commit an act of terrorism, 18 U.S.C. § 2 therefore makes it illegal to aid and abet an 
act of terrorism. 
187 Boim I, 291 F.3d at 1019; see id. at 1020 (citing SENATE REPORT, supra 
note 36, at 22); id. at 1021 (citing Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate 
Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 188 (1994)) (“[P]olicy considerations may be 
used to interpret the text and structure of a statute when a literal reading would lead 
to a result so bizarre that Congress could not have intended it.”); id. (“Also, and 
perhaps more importantly, there would not be a trigger to pull or a bomb to blow up 
without the resources to acquire such tools of terrorism and to bankroll the persons 
who actually commit the violence.”). 
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liability to all points along the causal chain of terrorism.”188 
Consequently, the class of possible defendants under § 2333 includes 
both primary and secondary actors, and aiders and abettors of 
terrorism can be held liable to the same extent as the terrorists 
themselves.189 
 
2. Elements of Donor Liability Under § 2333 
 
 To successfully hold donors to terrorism liable under a § 2333 
secondary liability theory, a plaintiff must adequately prove the 
elements of aiding and abetting liability, as well as the traditional tort 
requirements of actual causation and proximate causation.190 
According to Judge Rovner, there are three aiding and abetting 
elements applicable to § 2333 cases: the defendant (1) knew about the 
terrorist organization’s illegal activities, (2) intended to help those 
illegal activities succeed, and (3) engaged in some act of helping those 
activities succeed.191 According to Judge Rovner, requiring proof that 
the defendant specifically intended to further the terrorists’ illegal 
activities would allow the court to distinguish between the truly 
culpable and the innocent.192 Yet, Judge Rovner seemingly recognized 
the difficulty that plaintiffs would likely encounter when trying to 
prove such intent with direct evidence; thus, under Judge Rovner’s 
framework, a plaintiff can prove the requisite intent with 
circumstantial evidence, allowing the fact finder to infer a defendant’s 
intent to further terrorist activities.193  
                                                 
188 Id. at 1019–20. 
189 See Boim III, 549 F.3d 685, 712 (7th Cir. 2007) (citing Boim I, 291 F.3d at 
1016–21). 
190 See id.; Boim II, Nos. 05-1815, 05-1816, 05-1821, 05-1822, at 48, 59, 60–
61 (7th Cir. 2007), http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/tmp/PU0UUODT.pdf.; Boim I, 291 
F.3d at 1010. 
191 Boim II, at 48; Boim I, 291 F.3d at 1023 (citing United States v. Zafiro, 945 
F.2d 881, 887 (7th Cir. 1991)). 
192 See id. 
193 See id. 
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 For instance, a donation to Hamas, which has been a crime ever 
since Hamas was designated as a foreign terrorist organization in 
1997, would constitute “prima facie proof of one’s intent to further 
terrorism.”194 The same would be true if a defendant donated to a 
charitable organization that serves as a front for Hamas or any other 
terrorist group, or that has known ties to such a group.195 Alternatively, 
if a defendant merely donated money to a hospital controlled by 
Hamas but which otherwise lacks ties to terrorist activities, and if the 
defendant did so with the intention of funding that hospital’s medical 
services, the fact finder “would be free to conclude that the donor had 
a benign intent and did not aid or abet Hamas’s terrorism even if, in 
the abstract, one might believe that furthering Hamas’s humanitarian 
activity enhances its image and thereby supports its violent 
activities.”196 
 In addition to evidence of financial contributions, Judge Rovner 
seems to believe that plaintiffs could also circumstantially prove 
purposeful intent with other types of evidence. For instance, the 
district court on summary judgment found the following as sufficient 
evidence of AMS’s intent to help—and its acts of helping—Hamas’s 
illegal activities succeed: (1) AMS representatives participated in a 
meeting, attended by Hamas officials, during which the attendees 
discussed ways to continue to support Hamas; (2) AMS contributed 
money to HLF and routinely encouraged others to do the same; (3) 
AMS published and distributed pro-Hamas documents, one of which 
included an editorial advocating “martyrdom” operations; (4) AMS 
tried to rally public support for individuals with ties to Hamas, such as 
Salah, when they were arrested for or charged with supporting 
terrorism; and (5) AMS invited pro-Hamas speakers to participate in 
its annual conferences, once of which featured a veiled Hamas terrorist 
as a guest speaker.197 
                                                 
194 Id. 
195 See id. 
196 Id. 
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 Although Judge Rovner disagreed with Judge Posner and the en 
banc majority as to whether § 2333 creates primary or secondary 
liability, and as to what level of knowledge or intent the defendant 
must be shown to have had, Judge Rovner most passionately dissented 
because of Judge Posner’s application of the causation standards.198 
Specifically, Judge Rovner believed that Judge Posner’s framework 
not only relaxed “the basic tort requirement that causation be proven,” 
but actually eliminated it altogether.199 In Judge Rovner’s view, it was 
not “that the plaintiffs were unable to show causation,” but “rather that 
they did not even make an attempt;” and, it was for that reason that the 
Boim II panel decided to remand the case.200 
 To hold a defendant liable under Judge Rovner’s § 2333 
framework, a plaintiff must prove causation by a preponderance of the 
evidence.201 Of course, plaintiffs in typical tort cases must show “a 
causal link between the defendant’s actions and the plaintiff’s 
injury.”202 However, because these types of defendants are only 
secondary actors, Judge Rovner explained at length in the Boim II 
opinion exactly what causation means in this context,203 including a 
review of extensive precedent where a sufficient causal link was found 
between the secondary actor’s conduct and the resulting injury.204 
Perhaps most importantly, requiring proof of causation does not mean 
that, in the Boims’ case, they must “link specific donations or other 
acts of support to David Boim’s murder in particular”;205 rather, the 
plaintiffs must provide sufficient evidence “that the defendants’ 
conduct caused terrorist activity that included the shooting of 
                                                 
198 See Boim III, 549 F.3d at 705. 
199 Id. 
200 Id. 
201 Id.; Boim II, at 59, 63. 
202 See Boim II, at 59. 
203 See id. at 62–72. 
204 See id. at 66–72. 
205 Boim III, 549 F.3d at 709–10 (citing Boim II, at 63) (“Nothing in Boim I 
demands that the plaintiffs establish a direct link between the defendants’ donations 
(or other conduct) and David Boim’s murder—that they funded in particular the 
terrorists who killed David Boim, for example. . .”). 
 405
34
Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 4, Iss. 2 [2009], Art. 6
https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol4/iss2/6
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                           Volume 4, Issue 2                       Spring 2009 
David.”206 Furthermore, a defendant’s conduct need not have been the 
sole cause of the plaintiff’s injury; instead, “it is enough that it be a 
cause of the [terrorist] act and the resulting harm.”207 Because these 
rules are somewhat vague, however, Judge Rovner illustrated five 
ways in which plaintiffs could successfully prove causation.208 
 First, the plaintiff could certainly prove causation by establishing 
a direct causal link between the defendants’ acts and the plaintiff’s 
actual injury—here, David Boim’s death.209 Judge Rovner noted that 
the Boims proposed such a theory in Boim I, “theorizing that the 
defendants had channeled funds into a central pool of money that was 
used to train terrorists, buy their weapons, and so forth—and that the 
terrorists who killed David Boim had been trained and armed using 
those funds.”210 But, again, such direct evidence is not required to 
prove actual causation, because the fact finder could reasonably 
concluded that a defendant’s material support to a terrorist 
organization is “as essential in bringing about the organization’s 
terrorist acts as those who plan and carry out those acts.”211 Therefore, 
a second method of proving causation could include the defendant’s 
statements that he had provided funds to a terrorist organization to 
purchase weapons and had otherwise supported the organization by 
training terrorists.212 In fact, the Boims pointed to one of Salah’s 
                                                 
206 Boim II, at 63; see Boim III, 549 F.3d at 710 (insisting that the plaintiffs 
establish “proof that the types of support the defendants were alleged to have given 
Hamas were, in fact, a cause of Hamas’s terrorism”). 
207 Boim II, at 64 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 26 cmt. c 
(Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD)]; id. at cmt. 
l; RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 135, at § 430 cmts. d, e). In other words, 
Judge Rovner’s view is that the defendant’s act need not be a but-for cause (or a 
“necessary condition”), but merely a sufficient condition or “substantial factor,” of 
the plaintiff’s injury. See id. at 60 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD), § 26 (“Factual 
Cause”); id. at § 26 cmt. b (but-for causation) ; RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 
135, at § 9 cmt. b (“substantial factor”)). 
208 See id. at 62–65. 
209 Id. at 62. 
210 Id. 
211 Id. (citing Boim I, 291 F.3d 1000, 1021 (7th Cir. 2002)). 
212 See id. at 63. 
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statements in which he made these specific claims.213 This would 
prove causation because the fact finder could reasonably conclude a 
subsequent terrorist attack—and the resulting injuries—“were in part 
caused by Salah’s actions, even if Salah had no role in planning and 
executing a particular terrorist act.”214 
 A third example would be proof that the defendant established a 
network in the United States for the purpose of providing ongoing 
financial support for Hamas’s terrorist activities. In that situation, the 
fact finder could reasonably infer that establishing this type of network 
caused subsequent Hamas terrorist acts, “even if no line could be 
drawn linking a particular dollar raised to a particular terrorist act.”215 
Fourth, even if a defendant contributed solely to a terrorist 
organization’s humanitarian or charitable arms, this could suffice to 
establish an inference of causation if the plaintiff proved that, in doing 
so, the defendant freed up the terrorist organization’s resources and, 
thus, enabled more funds to be put toward the organization’s terrorist 
activities.216 Moreover, it is possible that even “relatively minor 
financial contributions to terrorists or other minor acts of support 
would be sufficient” to establish causation.”217 
 Finally, under Judge Rovner’s approach, a plaintiff must prove 
that the injury was a proximate cause of the tortious conduct or, in 
other words, that it was foreseeable to the defendant.218 Not only is 
                                                 
213 Id. (citing Boim v. Quranic Literacy Inst., 340 F. Supp. 2d 885, 899 (N.D. 
Ill. 2004)) (noting that the Boims identified an August 1995 statement in which 
Salah wrote that, “in the early 1990s, he had helped to test and train terrorists, 
funneled money to Hamas for the purchase of weapons, and had coordinated with 
other Hamas leaders in rebuilding Hamas’s infrastructure and command”).  
214 Id. 
215 Id. at 63–64. 
216 Id. at 64–65. 
217 Id. at 66. This is true because, according to Judge Rovner, “the conduct 
need only be one of the causes,” yet need not be “the predominant or primary cause 
of the injury.” Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 207 § 26 cmts. c, j, & l; 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 135, § 430 cmts. d & e). 
218 See id. at 57. In her dissent, Judge Wood notes that the term “proximate 
causation” is “imprecise at best,” as pointed out in the Proposed Final Draft to the 
Restatement (Third) of Torts. Boim III, 549 F.3d 685, 724 (7th Cir. 2008) (citing 
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foreseeability a required element to prove any tort, but, according to 
Judge Rovner, it is also explicitly required under § 2333 because that 
statute provides a private right of action to a person who is injured “by 
reason of” an act of international terrorism.219 A defendant will 
generally only be liable for injuries that would have reasonably been 
seen as a “natural consequence” of his actions.220 In this context, the 
plaintiff must at least show that murder was a reasonably foreseeable 
consequence of providing funds or other material support.221 
According to Judge Rovner, if the plaintiff could prove this—along 
with the three aiding and abetting elements,222 as well as a causal link 
between the defendant’s conduct and the plaintiff’s injury223—the 
plaintiff would be able to establish that the defendant was liable for a 
violation of § 2333. 
 
IV. THE PROPER FRAMEWORK OF LIABILITY UNDER § 2333 
 
 A thorough analysis of both Judge Posner’s majority opinion and 
Judge Rovner’s dissenting opinion reveals that neither judge’s 
framework provides the most legally sound standard for liability. By 
addressing the infirmities of both opinions, this Part develops a more 
grounded framework for other courts to apply when presented with 
§ 2333 donor liability cases. 
 
                                                                                                                   
RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 207, at ch. 6, (Special Note on Proximate 
Cause)). Instead, the Restatement (Third) refers to this concept as “scope of 
liability,” recognizing that, “[a]t some point, the harm is simply too remote from the 
original tortious act to justify holding the actor responsible for it.” Id. 
219 Id.; see Boim I, 291 F.3d 1000, 1011 (7th Cir. 2002) (citing Holmes v. Sec. 
Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258 (1992)) (“[T]he statute itself requires that in order 
to recover, a plaintiff must be injured ‘by reason of’ an act of international terrorism. 
The Supreme Court has interpreted identical language to require a showing of 
proximate cause.”). 
220 Boim I, 291 F.3d at 1012. 
221 Boim II, at 57 (citing Boim I, 291 F.3d at 1012) (emphasis omitted). 
222 See supra note 196 and accompanying text. 
223 See supra note 208 and accompanying text. 
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A. Primary and Secondary Liability 
 
 As it turns out, both primary and secondary liability theories are 
available to plaintiffs bringing claims against donors under § 2333. 
First, a primary liability theory is available, though not for the reasons 
Judge Posner provided when laying out the so-called “chain of explicit 
statutory incorporations by reference.”224 Judge Posner determined 
that the defendants’ conduct satisfies § 2331’s definition of 
international terrorism by concluding that donating money to Hamas—
or even to Hamas’s humanitarian wing or a purported Hamas-affiliated 
charity—is an act dangerous to human life.225 This is extremely 
problematic. What Judge Posner deems a foregone conclusion was in 
fact rejected by Judge Rovner226 and the district court,227 as well as 
the United States as amicus curiae in Boim III.228 The literal act of
transferring money to Hamas does not endanger human life 
whatsoever; rather, the result of giving money to Hamas may be 
violent terrorist activities which, in turn, result in the endangerment of 
human life. 
 
                                                
 Despite the fact that primary liability is not available for the 
reasons set forth by Judge Posner, it is nevertheless a viable theory. 
Under a primary liability theory, a plaintiff must show that he (or his 
heir) was injured or killed by reason of a crime that constitutes an act 
of international terrorism committed by the defendant.229 As Judge 
Rovner and other courts have recognized, actions giving rise to 
 
224 See Boim III, 549 F.3d 685, 690 (7th Cir. 2008). 
225 See id. 
226 See id. at 708.  
227 See Boim v. Quranic Literacy Inst., 127 F. Supp. 2d 1002, 1015 (N.D. Ill. 
2001). 
228 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 27–28 & n.6, Boim v. Holy 
Land Found. for Relief & Dev., 549 F.3d 685 (7th Cir. 2008) (Nos. 05-1815, 05-
1816, 05-1821, 05-1822). 
229 See 18 U.S.C. § 2333(a) (2006); Linde v. Arab Bank, PLC, 384 F. Supp. 2d 
571, 580 (E.D.N.Y. 2005). 
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criminal liability under §§ 2339A and 2339B230 can serve as the basis 
for civil liability under § 2333, because §§ 2339A and 2339B elucidate 
conduct prohibited under § 2333 by providing examples of what 
constitutes an act of international terrorism.231 Put another way, 
Congress’s subsequent enactment of §§ 2339A and 2339B confirmed 
and clarified that providing material support to terrorists or designated 
foreign terrorist organizations is itself an act of international 
terrorism.232 Therefore, if a plaintiff can establish a violation of either 
§ 2339A or § 2339B, he can satisfy the first element of a § 2333 claim: 
an act of international terrorism.233 
 In addition, contrary to Judge Posner’s conclusion, a plaintiff in 
this type of case may proceed on a theory of secondary liability. As 
recognized by Judge Rovner,234 the United States as amicus curiae in 
Boim I and Boim III,235 and various other courts,236 Central Bank is 
distinguishable and thus not a bar to aiding and abetting liability under 
§ 2333. Moreover, the Court in Central Bank did not hold that 
secondary liability is available only if the statute explicitly provides 
                                                 
230 For the relevant language of these criminal provisions, see supra text 
accompanying notes 40 and 42. 
231 See Boim I, 291 F.3d 1000, 1014–16 (7th Cir. 2002); Linde, 384 F. Supp. 
2d at 581 (citing Boim I, 291 F.3d at 1014–15); Boim, 127 F. Supp. 2d at 1016 
(holding that providing material support or resources for terrorism constitutes an act 
of international terrorism under § 2333). 
232 See Boim I, 291 F.3d at 1014–16; Linde, 384 F. Supp. 2d at 581. 
233 The same holds true regarding a violation of § 2339C. See Linde, 384 F. 
Supp. 2d at 582. 
234 See Boim I, 291 F.3d at 1019; supra text accompanying notes 183–87. 
235 See Boim I, 291 F.3d at 1017; Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae 
Supporting Affirmance at 21, Boim v. Quranic Literacy Inst., 291 F.3d 1000 (7th 
Cir. 2002) (Nos. 01-1969, 01-1970); Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 
5, 11, Boim, 549 F.3d 685 (Nos. 05-1815, 05-1816, 05-1821, 05-1822). 
236 See, e.g., Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp. 2d 250, 261–62 (E.D.N.Y. 2006); 
Linde, 384 F. Supp. 2d at 583; Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 2002 WL 
319887 at *16 (E.D.N.Y. 2002). 
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for it.237 Rather, Central Bank stands for the proposition that there is 
simply no presumption that aiding and abetting is always available in 
all federal civil statutes.238 Consequently, the court must determine on 
a case-by-case basis whether the text and history of a particular statute 
extends liability to aiders and abettors.239 
 When looking at the language, context, and history of § 2333, it 
becomes quite clear that Congress intended to create secondary 
liability. First, although Congress exempted certain parties from 
liability—such as the United States and foreign states240—Congress 
did not address or restrict the liability of any other type of 
defendant.241 Second, the legislative history of § 2333 illustrates that 
Congress was specifically looking to enable plaintiffs to sue not only 
terrorists and terrorist organizations, but also those who aid in terrorist 
activity.242 Finally, Congress intended to incorporate common law tort 
principles into § 2333, and such principles include attaching liability 
to those who “make it possible for some actor grievously to injure 
somebody else.”243 
                                                 
237 See Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 
511 U.S. 164, 177 (1994) (“To be sure, aiding and abetting a wrongdoer out to be 
actionable in certain instances.”). 
238 Cent. Bank, 511 U.S. at 182; see Boim I, 291 F.3d at 1018. 
239 See Boim I, 291 F.3d at 1018; Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae 
at 5, Boim, 549 F.3d 685 (Nos. 05-1815, 05-1816, 05-1821, 05-1822). 
240 See 18 U.S.C. § 2337 (2006). 
241 See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 6–7, Boim, 549 F.3d 
685 (Nos. 05-1815, 05-1816, 05-1821, 05-1822). 
242 See id. at 10 (quoting SENATE REPORT, supra note 36, at 22) (noting, for 
example, that the Senate Report on § 2333(a) emphasized that the statute sought to 
impose “liability at any point along the causal chain of terrorism” to “interrupt, or at 
least imperil, the flow of money” to terrorists and terrorist organizations) (emphasis 
added) (internal quotations omitted); see also id. at 9 (quoting Senate Hearing, supra 
note 33, at 126 (statement of Prof. Wendy Perdue)) (discussing questions raised at 
the congressional hearings regarding whether the remedy would extend to “the 
organizations, businesses, and nations who support, encourage, and supply 
terrorists[,] who are likely to have reachable assets”) (internal quotations omitted). 
243 Senate Hearing, supra note 33, at 136 (statement of Joseph Morris, General 
Counsel, United States Information Agency). 
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 Nevertheless, although Judge Rovner was correct that § 2333 
provides for secondary liability, she incorrectly enumerated the 
elements required to prove civil aiding and abetting liability under 
§ 2333. In Boim I, Judge Rovner concluded that proving that a 
defendant aided and abetting an act of international terrorism would 
require evidence that the defendant (1) knew of Hamas’s illegal 
activities; (2) desired to help those activities succeed; and (3) engaged 
in some act of helping the illegal activities.244 However, when setting 
forth this standard, Judge Rovner cited United States v. Zafiro—a 
criminal aiding and abetting case.245 Yet, less is required in terms of 
the intent element to establish civil aiding and abetting liability.246 
Instead, as explained by other courts, as well as the United States as 
amicus curiae in Boim III, the general standards for civil aiding and 
abetting liability are summarized in Halberstam v. Welch,247 which the 
Supreme Court described as “a comprehensive opinion on the 
subject.”248 
 In Halberstam, the D.C. Circuit relied on the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts and an array of federal case law to develop a 
comprehensive standard for civil aiding and abetting liability.249 In 
                                                 
244 See Boim I, 291 F.3d 1000, 1023 (7th Cir. 2002); supra note 191 and 
accompanying text. 
245 See Boim I, 291 F.3d at 1023 (citing United States v. Zafiro, 945 F.2d 881, 
887 (7th Cir. 1991)). 
246 See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 16, Boim, 549 F.3d 685 
(Nos. 05-1815, 05-1816, 05-1821, 05-1822). Furthermore, the United States noted 
that “a heightened showing of intent” to further the primary actor’s illegal goals (as 
would be required under Judge Rovner’s aiding and abetting formulation) “is not 
always required for aiding/abetting liability even in the criminal context.” Id. (citing 
United States v. Fountain, 768 F.2d 790, 797–98 (7th Cir. 1985)). 
247 See Linde v. Arab Bank, PLC, 384 F. Supp. 2d 571, 583 (E.D.N.Y. 2005); 
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 15–16, Boim, 549 F.3d 685 (Nos. 05-
1815, 05-1816, 05-1821, 05-1822) (citing Halberstam v. Welch, 705 F.2d 472 (D.C. 
Cir. 1983)). 
248 Cent. Bank of Denver N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 
U.S. 164, 181 (1994). 
249 Halberstam, 705 F.2d at 477–78 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra 
note 135, at § 876). 
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doing so, the court held that civil aiding and abetting liability typically 
rests upon proof of the following elements: “(1) the party whom the 
defendant aids must perform a wrongful act that causes an injury; (2) 
the defendant must generally be aware of his role as part of an overall 
illegal or tortious activity at the time he provides assistance; [and] (3) 
the defendant must knowingly and substantially assist the principal 
violation.”250 As to the third element, the Halberstam court identified 
six factors to determine whether the defendant’s assistance was 
sufficiently substantial.251 In addition, Halberstam required the 
plaintiff’s injury to have been a “natural and foreseeable consequence” 
of the activity that the defendant helped the principal undertake.252 
 Despite Halberstam’s usefulness in understanding civil aiding and 
abetting jurisprudence, it is nevertheless not the ideal standard to be 
applied under § 2333 for two reasons. First, Halberstam set forth these 
standards in the context of a negligence action.253 Section 2333, in 
contrast, creates an intentional tort. Therefore, as discussed in Part 
IV.B, secondary liability under § 2333 is also dependent on proof of 
some level of intent. Second, the Halberstam standard focuses 
extensively on whether the defendant provided substantial assistance 
to the primary actor.254 In the context of § 2333, however, the financial 
support provided by a defendant need not be “substantial” to qualify as 
“material support,” because “even small donations made knowingly 
                                                 
250 Id. at 477. 
251 Id. at 483–84. The D.C. Circuit took five of the factors from the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts and created a sixth factor. The five Restatement 
factors are: (1) “the nature of the act encouraged;” (2) “the amount [and kind] of 
assistance given;” (3) “the defendant’s absence or presence at the time of the tort;” 
(4) the defendant’s “relation to the tortious actor;” and (5) “the defendant’s state of 
mind.” Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 135, at § 876, cmt. d). The 
sixth factor added by the court is the duration of the assistance provided. Id. at 484. 
252 Id. at 488. 
253 The plaintiff in Halberstam, a widow, brought a wrongful death action 
against a primary and a secondary actor. 705 F.2d at 474. 
254 See id. at 478 (“Aiding and abetting focuses on whether a defendant 
knowingly gave ‘substantial assistance’ to someone who performed wrongful 
conduct. . .”). 
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and intentionally255 in support of terrorism may meet the standard for 
civil liability under section 2333.”256 
 For these reasons, a more appropriate civil aiding and abetting 
standard under the § 2333 statutory scheme would synthesize the 
appropriate elements propounded by Judge Rovner and the 
Halberstam court. The first element would combine two related 
concepts suggested by Judge Rovner and the Halberstam court and 
would require proof that the defendant knew of the organization’s 
illegal activities when it provided material support.257 Second, the 
plaintiff would need to prove that the defendant engaged in some act 
of helping the organization’s illegal activities—an element advocated 
by Judge Rovner258 and which is based on one of the Halberstam 
elements (but without the need for the assistance to have been 
substantial).259 Finally, the third element, taken from Halberstam, 
would require proof that the party whom the defendant aided had 
performed a tortious act that caused the relevant injury.260 This three 
element standard would be the most appropriate aiding and abetting 
standard to use in § 2333 cases because it incorporates commonly 
accepted civil aiding and abetting concepts while also taking into 
                                                 
255 See infra Part IV.B. 
256 Boim I, 291 F.3d 1000, 1015 (7th Cir. 2002); see Boim II, Nos. 05-1815, 
05-1816, 05-1821, 05-1822, at 65 (7th Cir. 2007), 
http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/tmp/PU0UUODT.pdf. (highlighting the “possibility 
that relatively modest financial contributions to terrorists or other minor acts of 
support would be sufficient to render the donor liable for the injuries subsequently 
inflicted by terrorists.”). 
257 See Boim I, 291 F.3d at 1023 (citing United States v. Zafiro, 945 F.2d 881, 
887 (7th Cir. 1991)) (requiring proof that the defendant “knew of Hamas’s illegal 
activities”); Halberstam, 705 F.2d at 477 (“[T]he defendant must generally be aware 
of his role as part of an overall illegal or tortious activity at the time he provides 
assistance.”). 
258 See Boim I, 291 F.3d at 1023 (citing Zafiro, 945 F.2d at 887). 
259 See Halberstam, 705 F.2d at 477 (“[T]he defendant must knowingly and 
substantially assist the principal violation.”). 
260 See Halberstam, 705 F.2d at 477 (“[T]he party whom the defendant aids 
must perform a wrongful act that causes an injury.”). 
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account what specifically is and is not required for liability under the 
§ 2333 statutory scheme. 
 
B. The Intent Requirement 
 
 In addition to proving the basic elements of primary liability 
(which, in donor liability situations, requires proof that the defendant 
violated §§ 2339A or 2339B)261 or secondary liability (which would 
require proof of the Judge Rovner-Halberstam synthesized 
standard),262 a plaintiff must also establish that the defendant acted 
with some type of intent. This is so because, as all sitting judges on the 
Seventh Circuit agree, § 2333 creates an intentional tort.263 Judge 
Posner concluded that the intentional tort state of mind element would 
be satisfied here if the defendant knew that the donee organization 
engages in terrorism or was deliberately indifferent to whether it does 
so.264 Judge Rovner incorporated the intent requirement through one 
of the three elements which she claimed were required to prove aidin
and abetting liability—namely, that the defendant intended to further 
the illegal goals of the donee organization.
g 
                                                
265 An analysis of 
intentional tort jurisprudence reveals that neither judge’s 
conceptualization nor explanation of the intent element is completely 
satisfactory, but that Judge Posner’s is the most accurate. 
 
 
261 See supra notes 231–33 and accompanying text. 
262 See supra notes 257–60 and accompanying text. 
263 See Boim III, 549 F.3d at 692 (majority opinion); id. at 720 (dissenting 
opinion authored by Judge Wood and joined in relevant part by Judges Rovner and 
Williams). 
264 See id. at 693. Judge Posner later elaborates on this by quoting the 
Restatement (Second): “‘If the actor knows that the consequences are certain, or 
substantially certain, to result from his act, and still goes ahead, he is treated by the 
law as if he had in fact desired to produce the result.’” Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND), supra note 135, § 8A cmt. b). 
265 See Boim II, Nos. 05-1815, 05-1816, 05-1821, 05-1822, at 48 (7th Cir. 
2007), http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/tmp/PU0UUODT.pdf.; Boim I, 291 F.3d at 
1023; supra text accompanying note 191. 
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1. Intent Means Purpose or Knowledge of a Substantial Certainty 
 
 The Restatement (Third) of Torts states that a person acts with 
intent if he either acts (1) with the purpose of producing a particular 
consequence or (2) “knowing that the consequence is substantially 
certain to result.”266 Additionally, the intent that must be shown is the 
intent “to bring about the type of harm that the particular tort seeks to 
prevent against.”267 The type of harm that § 2333 seeks to prevent 
against is the injuring or killing of a United States citizen by an act of 
international terrorism.268 Therefore, in § 2333 donor liability cases, a 
plaintiff must prove that the donor either (1) acted with the purpose of 
bringing about the injury or death of a United States citizen via an act 
of international terrorism, or (2) acted despite knowing that the injury 
or death of a United States citizen via an act of international terrorism 
was substantially certain to result.269 
 Although Judge Posner’s formulation of the state of mind element 
approaches this widely accepted rule,270 his wording misses the mark 
somewhat. First, as just described, intent is not defined as knowledge 
or deliberate difference (meaning not caring despite a substantial 
probability)—as Judge Posner claimed.271 Rather, intent is more 
precisely defined as purpose or knowledge of a near certainty.272 
                                                 
266 RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 207, at § 1; see also RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND), supra note 135, at § 8A (defining intent as a desire to cause the 
consequences of the act, or a belief that “the consequences are substantially certain 
to result from it”).  
267 RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 207, at § 1, cmt b. 
268 See 18 U.S.C. § 2333(a) (2006). 
269 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 207, at § 1 & cmt b. 
270 See, e.g., Eddy v. V.I. Water & Power Auth., 369 F.3d 227, 232 (3d Cir. 
2004) (intentional infliction of emotional distress); Ileto v. Glock, Inc., 349 F.3d 
1191, 1210 (9th Cir. 2003) (intentional interference of another’s interest in the use 
and enjoyment of his land); ANR W. Coal Dev. Co. v. Basin Elec. Power Coop., 267 
F.3d 957, 972 (8th Cir. 2002) (tortious interference with contract). 
271 See Boim III, 549 F.3d 685, 693 (7th Cir. 2007); supra text accompanying 
note 135. 
272 RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 207, at § 1. 
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Second, the consequence of the defendant’s intent is not that the 
organization engages in terrorism—as Judge Posner stated273—
because that is not the type of harm that § 2333 seeks to prevent 
against. Instead, the relevant consequence is the injuring or killing of a 
United States citizen by an act of international terrorism.274  
 Judge Rovner’s formulation of the intent element is likewise 
inaccurate. By adopting a standard used for criminal aiding and 
abetting liability, Judge Rovner required that the plaintiff prove that 
the defendant acted with the purpose of furthering the donee 
organization’s illegal goals.275 However, as just described, that also is 
not the proper formulation of the intent element. Moreover, Judge 
Rovner’s explanations for why she believed a defendant can be held 
liable only if he acted with specific intent or purpose are unavailing. 
For instance, Judge Rovner claimed that requiring proof that the 
defendant provided material support to further the terrorists’ illegal 
activities “would serve to single out the most culpable of Hamas’s 
financiers and other supporters by focusing on those who actually 
mean to contribute to its terrorist program, as opposed to those who 
may unwittingly aid Hamas’s terrorism by donating to its charitable 
arm.”276 Yet, courts and commentators across the country have 
                                                 
273 See Boim III, 549 F.3d at 693; supra text accompanying note 135. 
274 See 18 U.S.C. § 2333(a). 
275 See Boim II, Nos. 05-1815, 05-1816, 05-1821, 05-1822, at 48 (7th Cir. 
2007), http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/tmp/PU0UUODT.pdf.; Boim I, 291 F.3d at 1023 
(citing United States v. Zafiro, 945 F.2d 881, 887 (7th Cir. 1991)); supra text 
accompanying note 191. 
276 Boim III, 549 F.3d at 712. The second key reason Judge Rovner believed 
the defendant must have acted with the goal of furthering the organization’s illegal 
activities is because she thought any other level of intent would “pose[] a genuine 
threat to First Amendment freedoms.” Id. at 706. In particular, Judge Rovner was 
concerned with the idea of holding a defendant civilly liable for an organization’s 
illegal activity based solely on his contributions if the donee organization also 
engages in lawful activity. Id. at 713; see also id. at 713–15 (fully discussing her 
First Amendment concerns). Although the First Amendment implications of the 
intent requirement advocated in this Note are certainly important and worthy of 
further development, the issue is beyond the scope of this Note. However, for a 
general discussion of why Judge Rovner’s concerns are likely unwarranted, see 
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recognized that a defendant who contributes to a terrorist 
organization’s humanitarian wing is just as culpable as a defendant 
who contributes directly to the organization with the purpose of 
funding terrorism—because, among other reasons, augmenting 
humanitarian-directed funds frees up money that can be used for 
terrorist acts.277 Although this may be seen as a harsh restriction, 
Congress evidently saw it as necessary to effectively halt the financing 
that is so critical to perpetuating terrorism.278 And because requiring a 
plaintiff to prove a defendant’s purposeful intent would likely thwart 
Congress’s goal of eradicating terrorism by cutting off its vital 
                                                                                                                   
generally Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 205 F.3d 1130 (9th Cir. 2000), aff’d en 
banc, 393 F.3d 902 (9th Cir. 2004) (upholding § 2339B against a First Amendment 
challenge, despite its imposition of criminal liability without requiring an intent to 
further a terrorist organization’s illegal goals); Jeff Breinholt, Resolved, or Is It? The 
First Amendment and Giving Money to Terrorists, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 1273 (2008). 
277 See, e.g., Reno, 205 F.3d at 1136 (“[A]ll material support given to such 
organizations aids their unlawful goals. . .More fundamentally, money is fungible; 
giving support intended to aid an organization’s peaceful activities frees up resources 
that can be used for terrorist acts.”) (footnote omitted); id. at 1134 (“Material support 
given to a terrorist organization can be used to promote the organization’s unlawful 
activities, regardless of donor intent. Once the support is given, the donor has no 
control over how it is used.”); Angela A. Barkin, Comment, Corporate America—
Making a Killing: An Analysis of Why It Is Important to Hold American 
Corporations Who Fund Terrorist Organizations Liable for Aiding and Abetting 
Terrorism, 40 CAL. W. L. REV. 169, 185 (2003); see also, e.g., Boim III, 549 F.3d at 
698 (“But if you give money to an organization that you know to be engaged in 
terrorism, the fact that you earmark it for the organization’s nonterrorist activities 
does not get you off the liability hook.”); Linde v. Arab Bank, PLC, 384 F. Supp. 2d 
571, 580 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (citing Humanitarian Law Project, 205 F.3d at 1134). 
278 See, e.g., Humanitarian Law Project v. Gonzales, 380 F. Supp. 2d 1134, 
1146 (C.D. Cal. 2005), aff’d, Humanitarian Law Project v. Mukasey, 552 F.3d 916 
(9th Cir. 2009) (noting that Congress rejected the extensive objections made during 
the hearings on § 2339B, a violation of which does not require an intent to further 
any illegal activity, and that it in fact “made a specific finding [in § 2339B] that 
‘foreign organizations that engage in terrorist activity are so tainted by their criminal 
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financial lifelines, that standard simply cannot be required under 
§ 2333.279 
 There are several reasons why Judge Rovner’s purposeful intent 
standard cannot be the correct requirement under § 2333. First, if 
Judge Rovner’s purposeful intent requirement were adopted, there are 
many situations in which a defendant’s act of donating to Hamas or a 
Hamas-affiliated charity would subject him to criminal liability, but 
not civil liability.280 For instance, an organization could be found 
guilty under § 2339B for donating to Hamas’s humanitarian wing even 
if it merely knew that Hamas engages in terrorism;281 but, under Judge 
Rovner’s framework, a private plaintiff could not recover damages for 
the same act unless the plaintiff could prove that the organization 
donated with the purpose of furthering Hamas’s illegal activities. Yet, 
in almost every other area of law, criminal liability is imposed only for 
more egregious conduct.282 Second, Judge Rovner herself pointed out 
that “Congress expressed an intent in section 2333 to render civil 
liability at least as extensive as criminal liability,”283 and, in fact, that 
“Congress intended for civil liability for financing terrorism to sweep 
more broadly than the conduct described in sections 2339A and 
2339B.”284 Therefore, because the idea of requiring a defendant to 
have acted with purposeful intent as a prerequisite to civil—but not 
criminal—liability is contradictory to established jurisprudence and 
Congressional intent, it is clear that § 2333 liability cannot be based 
upon proof of such a specific intent.285 
 
                                                 
279 See Barkin, supra note 277, at 186. 
280 See Recent Case, Boim v. Quranic Literacy Institute, 291 F.3d 1000 (7th 
Cir. 2002), 116 HARV. L. REV. 713, 718 (2002).  
281 See supra note 42 and accompanying text. 
282 See Recent Case, supra note 280, at 718. 
283 Boim I, 291 F.3d 1000, 1019 (7th Cir. 2002). 
284 Id. at 1015 (emphasis added). 
285 See Barkin, supra note 277, at 185. 
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2. Application of the Intent Requirement 
 
 Of course, as with the majority of the Boims’ case, difficultly 
arises when determining exactly how a plaintiff would go about 
proving the requisite level of intent. To begin, however, the first 
meaning of intent—that the defendant acted with the purpose of 
bringing about the result—can essentially be eliminated from 
discussion. As Judge Posner noted, no donor would be “foolish 
enough to admit his true intent.”286 Therefore, although in some cases 
it may be possible to produce evidence that a defendant acted with the 
purpose of bringing about this particular result, its probable rarity 
renders it a less useful discussion. 
 With regard to the second meaning of intent, however, Judge 
Posner stated that a plaintiff would be able to satisfy the intent element 
by showing that the donor defendant knows the character of the donee 
organization.287 Despite Judge Posner’s somewhat imprecise 
description of the relevant intent rules,288 his application appears to be 
proper.289 According to Judge Posner, the Boims could have proved—
and, in his opinion, did prove—that the QLI and AMS had the 
requisite level of intent because they knew the nature of the 
organizations to which they donated.290 In other words, a plaintiff 
could hold a defendant liable with evidence that the defendant 
knowingly “contributed to a group engaged in the open and regular 
pursuit of violence,”291 because knowledge of the organization’s 
character certainly would have caused the defendant to know that, by 
                                                 
286 Boim III, 549 F.3d at 699. 
287 See id. at 695; supra text accompanying note 141. 
288 See supra notes 271–74 and accompanying text. 
289 See Brief for the 9/11 Families United to Bankrupt Terrorism in Support of 
Plaintiffs-Appellees’ Supporting Affirmance of the District Court’s Decision Below 
at 7, Boim v. Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev., 549 F.3d 685 (7th Cir. 2008) 
(Nos. 05-1815, 05-1816, 05-1821, 05-1822) [hereinafter Brief for the 9/11 Families 
United to Bankrupt Terrorism]. 
290 See Boim III, 549 F.3d at 701–02. 
291 See Brief for the 9/11 Families United to Bankrupt Terrorism, supra note 
289, at 7. 
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providing material support, it was substantially certain that a United 
States citizen would be injured or killed by the donee’s violent acts.  
 In terms of proof, the plaintiffs could rely on circumstantial 
evidence to allow the fact finder to infer that the defendant had the 
requisite type of knowledge of the donee organization.292 For instance, 
in Boim, the plaintiffs presented evidence that AMS rallied public 
support for individuals with ties to Hamas, such as Salah, when they 
were arrested for or charged with supporting terrorism.293 While such 
support is certainly not illegal, and although a defendant could not be 
held liable under § 2333 solely for engaging in such support,294 it does 
help create a basis for inferring that AMS knew that Hamas engages in 
terrorism.295 Additionally, in future cases, knowledge of the donee 
organization’s character can be inferred somewhat easily because 
many or most terrorist organizations (including Hamas) are now 
officially designated by the U.S. government as a Foreign Terrorist 
Organizations (FTO).296 Thus, everyone is on constructive notice that 
these organizations engage in international terrorist activities which 
may injure or kill a United States citizen.297 In the Boims’ case, 
however, Hamas had not been designated as an FTO until 1997298—
after David was killed and, thus, after the relevant donations were 
                                                 
292 See supra text accompanying note 197. 
293 Boim II, Nos. 05-1815, 05-1816, 05-1821, 05-1822, at 51 (7th Cir. 2007), 
http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/tmp/PU0UUODT.pdf.. 
294 See Boim III, 549 F.3d at 700; Boim I, 291 F.3d 1000, 1023 (7th Cir. 2002) 
(citing NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 920 (1982)). 
295 See Boim v. Quranic Literacy Inst., 340 F. Supp. 2d 885, 911 (N.D. Ill. 
2004). 
296 As Judge Rovner noted, a donation to Hamas or any other designated FTO 
after its designation in 1997 could serve as prima facie proof of even one’s 
purposeful intent to further terrorism, Boim III, 549 F.3d at 712, and thus could also 
create an inference of the lesser level of intent. 
297 See Breinholt, supra note 276, at 1288. 
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made. Therefore, in the Boims’ case, more traditional circumstantial 
evidence would be necessary.299 
 An additional hurdle to overcome in the Boims’ case is the fact 
that the defendants often did not donate directly to Hamas,300 and, 
thus, inferring the defendants’ knowledge of Hamas’s character would 
be insufficient to satisfy the intent element. Rather, some of the 
recipient organizations were Hamas-controlled charitable 
organizations or were otherwise connected with the humanitarian wing 
of Hamas.301 Even if this is true, however, Judge Posner stated that 
“[a]nyone who knowingly contributes to the nonviolent wing of an 
organization that he knows to engage in terrorism is knowingly 
contributing to the organization’s terrorist activities.”302 Again, 
although his use of the term “knowledge” is somewhat off-target, 
Judge Posner aptly clarified that donating to an intermediary does not 
automatically relieve the defendant of liability simply because the 
intermediary does not engage in violent acts itself. Therefore, it can be 
said that a defendant has the requisite level of intent even if he 
provides material support to a nonviolent intermediary organization, as 
long as the defendant knew that the intermediary organization had a 
substantial connection to a violent organization, such as Hamas. This 
would allow the fact finder to conclude that the defendant provided 
material support to the intermediary with knowledge of a near 
certainty that it would result in the injury or death of a United States 
citizen by an act of international terrorism. 
 
                                                 
299 But see Exec. Order 12,947, 60 Fed. Reg. 5079, 5081 (Jan 25, 1995) 
(prohibiting the provision of funds to Hamas as of January 25, 1995); Brief for the 
9/11 Families United to Bankrupt Terrorism, supra note 289, at 7–8 (noting that 
Hamas’s reputation as a lethal terrorist organization preceded its official designation 
by several years” and that, based on media coverage, “donors were on notice of 
Hamas’s commitment to suicide bombings” even as of April 1994). 
300 See Boim III, 549 F.3d at 706. 
301 Id. 
302 Id. at 698. 
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C. Causation & Proximate Causation 
 
 Finally, under either a primary or secondary liability theory, and in 
addition to some level of intent, a plaintiff must also prove the other 
elements of an intentional tort—namely, causation and proximate 
causation. 
 Judge Rovner’s heated attack on Judge Posner’s causation 
analysis303 made it appear as though she vehemently disagreed with 
the causation rules that he reviewed. However, the standards laid out 
by Judge Rovner for proving causation are quite similar to those 
described by Judge Posner. For instance, both judges agreed that 
proving traditional but-for causation is not necessary,304 and that the 
Boims did not need to prove that the defendants’ material support was 
somehow used to facilitate the specific attack that killed David 
Boim.305 Similarly, both judges agreed that the Boims would not need 
to prove that each defendant was the sole or principal cause of 
Hamas’s terrorist activity in general, but rather that they must at least 
prove that the defendant was “part of the causal chain that indirectly 
facilitated Hamas’s terrorist activities.”306 For the reasons set forth by 
both judges, it appears as though these causation principles are 
fundamentally sound, and should be applied to § 2333 cases. 
 As with the intent element, the application of the causation 
standard to the Boims’ case illustrates the complexity of these cases, 
and it was also seemingly the main reason Judge Rovner felt that 
Judge Posner had eliminated the requirement of proving causation.307 
In Judge Rovner’s opinion, the Boims had not yet proven causation, 
and therefore, if for no other reason, she believed the case should have 
                                                 
303 See Boim III, 549 F.3d at 705, 709–10; supra notes 198–200. 
304 See id. at 695; Boim II, Nos. 05-1815, 05-1816, 05-1821, 05-1822, at 64 
(7th Cir. 2007), http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/tmp/PU0UUODT.pdf.. 
305 See Boim III, 549 F.3d at 695; id. at 709–10 (Rovner, J., dissenting). 
306 Matthew T. Glavin, Combating Terrorism: Will Civil Penalties Help Win 
the War on Terror?, 14 PUB. INT. L. REP. 99, 101 (2008); see Boim III, 549 F.3d at 
695–97; Boim II, at 64–66, 71. 
307 See Boim III, 549 F.3d at 705. 
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been remanded.308 In fact, at oral argument and in their briefs for the 
Boim II appeal, the Boims’ counsel acknowledged that they did not 
even attempt to prove causation309—because they (correctly) thought 
that but-for causation did not have to be proven in an aiding and 
abetting case, and because they (mistakenly) thought Boim I had only 
required them to prove proximate causation.310 However, as both 
Judge Posner and Judge Rovner pointed out, although traditional but-
for causation is not a necessary element in an aiding and abetting case, 
some sort of legal causation must still be established—in addition to 
proximate causation.311 
 Under the proper causation standard, a plaintiff would have to 
prove that the recipient of the defendant’s material support was 
“sufficiently affiliated with” the terrorist organization, such that the 
material support “indirectly supported [the organization’s] terrorist 
mission.”312 As this applies to the Boims’ case, it would require proof 
that “QLI’s and AMS’s actions amounted to at least a sufficient cause 
of the terrorist act that killed David Boim, even if, on [the] facts, there 
were multiple such causes.”313 In her opinion in Boim II, Judge 
Rovner detailed numerous similar cases where this type of causation 
standard was utilized.314 The fact that plaintiffs were able to prove 
causation under the standard set forth in these cases shows that 
requiring plaintiffs to prove causation is not unduly burdensome; 
                                                 
308 Boim III, 549 F.3d at 705. 
309 See Brief of Appellee, supra note 30, at 23–24 (citing Boim I, 291 F.3d 
1000, 1011–12) (7th Cir. 2002)) (arguing that Boim I held that § 2333’s “by reason 
of” language only required them to prove proximate causation); Audio recording: 
Oral Argument (Part 2) for Boim v. Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev., Nos. 05-
1815, 05-1816, 05-1821, 05-1822 (7th Cir. 2007) (Nov. 30, 2005), available at 
http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/tmp/MN0S7YW6.mp3 (argument of Nathan Lewin, 
counsel for Stanley and Joyce Boim). 
310 See Boim II, at 73. 
311 See Boim III, 549 F.3d at 695–97; Boim II, at 710–11). 
312 Boim III, 549 F.3d at 724 (Wood, J., dissenting). 
313 Id. at 723; see also Boim II, at 65 (requiring “some evidence of a causal link 
between a defendant’s conduct” and the type of attack that killed David Boim). 
314 See Boim II, at 66–72; supra note 204 and accompanying text. 
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rather, Judge Rovner’s causation requirement is “sufficiently flexible 
to account for the reality that a terrorist act may have many ca
without abandoning the longstanding tort requirement that an act hav
some factual nexus with the plaintiff’s injury before it may be deem





                                                
315
 Finally, with regard to proximate causation, the proper standard is 
merely that the plaintiff’s injury or death was a “natural and 
foreseeable consequence” of providing the material support.316 Judge 
Posner correctly pointed out that, in § 2333 cases, this standard would 
allow for the imposition of liability even a significant number of years 
after the actual support was given.317 While this rule seems somewhat 
atypical, it makes sense, given the nature of terrorism.318 This is 
because if a defendant provides material support to an organization, 
with knowledge of a substantial certainty that it will result in the 
injuring or killing of a United States citizen by an act of international 
terrorism, it simply does not matter if the act of terrorism leading to an 
American’s injury or death occurs fifty years after the donation. It is 
true that, “as the temporal or factual chain between the tortious act and 
the harm becomes ever longer, the likelihood of intervening or 
superseding causes becomes greater”;319 however, even if the donated 
money is never actually used to carry out an act of terrorism, the 
donor’s money or other material support could be used to keep the 
terrorist organization afloat, enabling it to continue to exist even fifty 
years later and, thus, enabling the terrorist act to occur320. Therefore, 
because the injury or death of an American citizen by an act of 
international terrorism is certainly a “natural and foreseeable 
consequence” of providing material support to an organization 
 
315 Boim II, at 72. 
316 See Halberstam v. Welch, 705 F.2d 472, 488 (D.C. Cir. 1983); see also 
Boim II, at 61–62. 
317 See Boim III, 549 F.3d at 699–700; supra text accompanying note 159. 
318 See Boim III, 549 F.3d at 700. 
319 Id. at 724 (Wood, J., dissenting). 
320 Id. at 700 (majority opinion) (“Seed money for terrorism can sprout acts of 
violence long after the investment.”). 
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involved in terrorism321—even fifty years later—the proximate 
causation requirement likely will not present a significant obstacle to 
liability in § 2333 cases. 
 In sum, the most appropriate framework for holding a donor liable 
under § 2333 would require a plaintiff to prove that: 
 (1) the defendant either 
  (a) violated §§ 2339A or 2339B (primary liability); or 
  (b) (i) knew of the organization’s illegal activities when it 
provided material support; (ii) engaged in some act of helping the 
organization’s illegal activities; and (iii) aided a principal who 
performed a tortious act that caused the relevant injury; 
 (2) the defendant either 
  (a) acted with the purpose of bringing about the injury or 
death of a United States citizen via an act of international terrorism; or 
  (b) acted despite knowing that the injury or death of a United 
States citizen via an act of international terrorism was substantially 
certain to result; 
 (3) the recipient of the defendant’s material support was 
sufficiently affiliated with a terrorist organization, such that the 
material support indirectly supported the terrorist organization’s 
violent goals; and  
 (4) the plaintiff’s injury or death was a natural and foreseeable 




 As terrorism continues throughout the world, so too will grieving 
families’ use of § 2333. Following in the Boims’ footsteps, other 
families will use § 2333 both to seek justice for their loved ones killed 
by senseless terrorist acts, and to bankrupt the financiers who enable 
such violence. Because other courts will look to the Boim decisions as 
the “critical authority” on § 2333,322 it was vital for the Seventh 
Circuit to employ the most legally sound standards when deciding 
                                                 
321 See id. at 694. 
322 Brief of Appellee, supra note 30, at 17. 
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Boim III. Unfortunately, although the court likely reached the correct 
result in Boim III, neither Judge Posner’s nor Judge Rovner’s 
framework incorporated the correct standard for each essential element 
of § 2333. The framework advocated in this Note, however, seeks to 
strike the delicate balance between following the traditional principles 
of tort law and fulfilling the purpose of § 2333. 
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